UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-19-2013

Renshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40512-2012

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Renshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40512-2012" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs. 869.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/869

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

GREGORY RENSHAW, an individual,

)
)

j

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40512-2012
Ada County Docket No. 2010-23898

)
V.

)

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation,

)
)
)
)

Defendant-Respondent,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

j

)
)
)
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware)
limited liability company; EXECUTIVE
)
TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; DOES I-V, and ABC
)
CORPORATIONS I-V,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

and

j

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal of Gregory Renshaw v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, et al in the Fourth Judicial
District of the State ofidaho,
in and for the County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 1023898
Honorable Deborah Bail, Presiding District Judge
John L. Runft, ISB #1059
Jon M. Steele, ISB # 1911
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400
Boise, ID 83702
Tel : (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
e-mail: JSteele@runftsteele.com
Attorneys for Appellant

Michael G. Halligan, ISB # 6874
Sussman Shank LLP
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400
Portland, OR 97205-3089
Tel: (503) 227-1111
Fax: (503) 248-0130
e-mail: mikeh({/)sussmanshank.com
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
GREGORY RENSHAW, an individual,

)
)

j

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40512-2012
Ada County Docket No. 2010-23898

)
V.

)

)

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

j

)

and

)
)
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware)
limited liability company; EXECUTIVE
)
TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; DOES I-V, and ABC
)
CORPORATIONS I-V,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

j

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal of Gregory Renshaw v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, et al in the Fourth Judicial
District of the State ofldaho,
in and for the County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 1023898
Honorable Deborah Bail, Presiding District Judge
John L. Runft, ISB #1059
Jon M. Steele, ISB # 1911
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400
Boise, ID 83 702
Tel : (208) 333-8506
Fax : (208) 343-3246
e-mail: JSteele(ciJ,rnnftsteele.com
Attorneys for Appellant

Michael G. Halligan, ISB # 6874
Sussman Shank LLP
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400
Portland, OR 97205-3089
Tel: (503) 227-1111
Fax: (503) 248-0130
e-mail: mikeh(lvsussmanshank. com
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................

iii

I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... .

IL

MERS WAS CREATED TO DODGE STA TE AND LOCAL
RECORDING REQUIREMENTS.................................................

2

THE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, THE AFFIDAVITS, THE DEPOSITIONS, THE
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS ON FILE AND THE
JUDICIALLY NOTICED PAPERS ARE PROOF THAT
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST............................

3

IV.

EDWARDS AND TROTTER ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE.......

5

V.

JUNE 6, 2013 DECISIONS OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT......

6

VI.

RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES....................................................................................

9

CONCLUSION.......................................................................

10

III.

VII.

APPENDIX
1. Brandup v. Recontrust Company, NA., Oregon Supreme Court,
June 6, 2013 ...................................................................... .
2. Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al, Oregon Supreme Court,
June 6, 2013 ...................................................................... .

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES
Brandup v. Reconstrust Company, NA., et al, filed June 6, 2013
(Oregon Supreme Court 2013) .................................................................... 7, 8
Edwards v. Jvlortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
2013 Opinion No. 53, Docket No. 38604-2011. ......................................... 5, 6, 9, 10
Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 67 P.3d 78 (2003) .............................................. 9
Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W. 2d 487 (Minn. 2009) ......... 1
Niday v. G1\!fAC Afortg., LLC, 251 Or. App. 278, 284 P.3d 1157 (2012) ................ 6, 7, 8
Ralph v.1'4et Life Home Loans, Case No. CV 2010-0200 in and for
the Fifth Judicial County of the State ofidaho, County of Minidoka,
August 10, 2011 ..................................................................................... 1, 3
Trotter v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, et al, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012) .............. 2, 5, 6, 10

STATUTES & RULES
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 ............................................................................... 9
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ............................................................................... 9

11

I.

INTRODUCTION
The Respondent's argument fails to address the facts of this case. Its entire argument is
generic, founded upon statutory construction, and fails to address its pleadings, its discovery
responses, the affidavits, depositions, and judicially noticed papers that are all a part of the
Clerk's Record. Its reliance upon the Minnesota Supreme Court case Jackson v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W. 2d 487 (Minn. 2009) is faulty. Minnesota adopted legislation

recognizing MERS and allowing it to "privatize" portions of its nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings.
Appellant stands in a position disfavored by the law.
payment in May of 20 l 0.

He made his last mortgage

Respondent, like other financially powerful entities, knows that

homeowners who are unable to pay their mortgages are unlikely to challenge the foreclosure and
loss of their home.

This lack of challenges encourages the Respondent and other powerful

financial institutions to take short cuts, to neglect critical and necessary documentation, and to
ignore the law. The Respondent has little at stake or risk.
Respondent has, often and repeatedly, been denied foreclosure in cases throughout Idaho.
Cases such as Ralph v. MetL(fe (R., pp. 652-662). But those cases are buried. They are not
reported, they are not appealed and they are discounted by the financial industry as outliers.
Through manipulation of our legal system, not only on an individual basis but also on a macro
basis, Defendant and the financial industry are able to cite this Court to decisions that favor its
position. But in these cases, the litigant is often a pro se homeowner who has no idea how to
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defeat a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Many of these homeowners
make credible arguments (such as Trotter) but have no evidence or citation to legal authority to
support their arguments.

Appellant has presented the District Court and this Court with

evidence, legal authorities, and credible arguments that defeat Respondent's entitlement to
summary judgment.

II.

MERS WAS CREATED TO DODGE STATE AND
LOCAL RECORDING REQUIREMENTS
Respondent would have this Court believe that it has solved title problems rather than
created title problems. See, Respondent's Opening Brief, pp. 7-8.

This contention ignores

hundreds of years of statutory and common law and ignores the function of local government in
maintaining accurate up-to-date land title records. In the words of District Court Judge Bail,
MERS was created in part to dodge state and local recording requirements and MERS' structure
skirts Idaho law that requires the public recording of the assignment of the trust deed. R., pp.
3390-3391. The MERS structure hanns counties who then do not have accurate records, an
issue of serious historical concern and also deprives counties of recording income. "The MERS
structure does harm state and county interests and was intended to evade recording obligations
and fees .... " R., pp. 3391-3392
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III.
THE DEFENDANT'S ANSvVER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THE
AFFIDAVITS, THE DEPOSITIONS, THE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS ON FILE
AND THE JUDICIALLY NOTICED PAPERS ARE PROOF THAT
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST
Included within the Clerk's Record are the pleadings, affidavits, discovery responses and
judicially noticed papers that prove, at the very least, genuine issues of fact exist that defeat
Respondent's entitlement to summary judgment.

Respondent's Answer to the Amended

complaint found at Clerk's Record, pages 243-260 includes admissions which create genuine
issues of fact.
Appellant's First Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 449) includes items 1-19 which were
judicially noticed and are included in the Record. Request No. 5 (R., p. 652-662) is the Idaho
District Court's case of Ralph v.

~MetLife

decided by Minidoka County District Court, Judge

Jonathan Brody. The Ralph decision is exactly on point.
As the Clerk's Record demonstrates this case is not an isolated event. During the period
from March 17, 2009 to June 11, 2011, 47 Notices of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of
Trust were executed on behalf of Defendant MERS and recorded in Ada County. R., pp. 461556.

During the period of February 26, 2009 to July 12, 2011, 39 Notices of Default and

Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust were recorded in Canyon County, Idaho. R., pp. 558-650.
Appellant has made two applications for a loan modification and been denied twice. The
Record clearly demonstrates that Defendant has violated the Home Affordable Modification
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Program. See, R., p. 817. These denials are evidence of negligence and violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act.
On the record before the Court there is no evidence to show, let alone prove, that
Defendant had any interest, let alone the beneficial interest, in Renshaw's property.
On the record before the Court there is an abundance of evidence that Renshaw's loan
was transferred multiple times. These assignments were not by operation of law but were true
conveyances ofRenshaw's Note and Deed of Trust.
On the record before the Court there is no issue of fact concerning the recording of the
Renshaw loan transfers. There is no recording of the multiple transfers.
On the record before the Court it is uncontroverted that Defendant has no stake or
interest of any kind in Renshaw's loan, his Note or his Deed of Trust.
On the record before the Court there is no issue of fact that Respondent failed to satisfy
the precondition that "any" assignment of the trust deed by the beneficiary be recorded prior to
commencing foreclosure.
On the record before the Court the failure to record any assignment prior to commencing
foreclosure violates the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings of the Idaho Trust Deed Act.
Renshaw has put admissible evidence supporting his assertions of negligence, errors in
foreclosure, misrepresentation, robo-signing, and fraud into the record. Expert reports of Mr.
Kahn, Ms. Emery, and Mr. Eppink detail the flaws, mistakes and misrepresentations of
Defendant.
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Defendant's pleadings and discovery responses, at a minimum, create triable issues of
fact. Appellant has by affidavits, pleadings, discovery responses, and judicial notice, at the very
least, created triable issues of fact concerning Defendant's conduct in commencing nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings against Appellant.

IV.

EDWARDS AND TROTTER ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE

The Idaho Deed of Trust Act is a well-coordinated statutory scheme designed to be
strictly construed to protect the grantor of a deed of trust. The Idaho law governing deeds of
trust makes no provision for the use of an entity such as MERS to supplant its requirements.
Recognizing that the Idaho Deed of Trust Act permits foreclosure without the necessity for
judicial actions, this Court has made it clear that the trustee's power of sale is subject to strict
statutory rules designed to protect the grantor. Nonjudicial foreclosure is allowed only where
the trust deed and any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary are recorded
in the mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated.
In order to protect the grantor against the unauthorized loss of its property a party conducting a
nonjudicial foreclosure must demonstrate strict compliance with the Act.
In the recent case of Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2013
Opinion No. 53, Docket No. 38604-2011 (Idaho Supreme Court), this Court stated that "[i]f
Plaintiff contends that ownership of the note and deed of trust had been severed, that documents
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may have been improperly signed, or that the notarization process was fraudulent, she should
have put into the record admissible evidence supporting such assertions. She did not." Id. at p.
10.
In Edwards, this Court found that the deed of trust was not given for the benefit of
MERS or to secure an obligation owing to MERS. Yet, the Edwards court found that "having
MERS the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the requirements of a deed
of trust under Idaho law." This conclusion was reached on the basis that MERS was designated
the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee for the lender.
In both Edwards and Trotter, this Court gave carte blanche to MERS and its lenders to
conduct nonjudicial foreclosures in Idaho. Based upon the record before the Court in each of
these cases the Court's decisions were correct. Other courts have also given MERS and its
lenders approval based upon statutory interpretation of those states' deed of trust statutes.
However, the most recent cases analyzing MERS structure and whether it complies with state
deed of trust acts have found that MERS is not entitled to the reviewing Court's blanket
approval.

V.

JUNE 6, 2013 DECISIONS OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT
The case of Niday v. GMAC Nlortg., LLC, 251 Or. App. 278, 284 P.3d 1157 (2012) was
cited by the trial court as authority that MERS' structure skirts Idaho law requiring the recording
of the assignments of deeds of trust. This intermediate Court of Appeals case was very recently
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reviewed and decided by the Oregon Supreme Court.
Two Oregon Supreme Court cases, Brandup v. Reconstrust Company, NA., et al, filed
June 6, 2013 (Oregon Supreme Court 2013) and Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, filed June 6,
2013 (Oregon Supreme Court 2013) 1 qualify MERS' entitlement to use of the nonjudicial
foreclosure statutes of Oregon.
In response to four certified questions from the United States District Court, the Oregon
Supreme Court found the following:
1.

An entity like MERS, which is not a lender, may not be a trnst deeds
"beneficiary" unless it is a lenders' successor in interest.

2.

The provision that MERS "holds only legal title to the interests granted by
Borrower in this Security Instrnment, but, if necessary to comply with law
or custom, MERS

***

has the right to exercise any or all of those

interest," does not convey to MERS the beneficial right to repayment of
the secured obligation, the inclusion of the provision does not alter the
trust deed's designation of the lender as the "beneficiary" or make MERS
eligible to serve in that capacity.
3.

The Oregon Trust Deeds Act does not reqmre recordation of
"assignments" of the trust deed by operation of law that result from the
transfer of the secured obligation. However, the trne beneficiary must be
identifiable. Where the foreclosing party is not the original lender, the

1

See, Respondent's Opening Brief at p. 17. "Niday is not a final statement of Oregon law ... " As of June 6, 2013,
Niday is a final statement of Oregon law.
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foreclosing party must provide definitive documentation of its status as
the lender's successor in interest to establish its right to foreclosure.
When lenders or successors in interest fail to record definitive
documentation they are vulnerable to challenges that may force them to
judicially establish their interest and authority to act. Niday at p. 36.
4(a)

Because MERS does not have the right to receive payment of the note, the
Oregon Deed of Trust Act does not allow MERS to hold and transfer legal
title to the trust deeds that secure them.
MERS holds neither the beneficial nor the legal interest of the trustee and
therefore it cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed. Niday at
pp. 46-47.

4(b)

MERS authority, if any, to perform any act in the foreclosure process
derives from the original beneficiary and its successors in interest. Niday
at p. 47.

In Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to MERS, et al. The Court found that " ... an issue of fact
remains as to the validity of ETS 's appointment as successor trustee, and, in consequence, its
authority to initiate and pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under the ODTA."
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Because the nonjudicial process does not involve a court, the legislature--in adopting the
Idaho Deed of Trust Act-wanted to substitute other safeguards to adequately protect borrowers.
These safeguards have been ignored by Respondent.

VI.
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN A vVARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

Respondent contends at p. 24 of its Brief that it is entitled to its fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41. However, neither of these appellate rules provides the authority
for awarding attorney fees. See, Edwards at 12, citing Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 67 P.3d
78 (2003).
Respondent also contends that this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation. This contention is wildly inaccurate and finds no support in the law or the
record of this case.
Lastly, Respondent contends that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the deed of
trust because of Section 9, Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property Under This Security
Instrument. The preamble to this section limits its application to "Borrower and Lender." See,
R., p. 168. MERS has contended it is the "Beneficiary." It has never contended that it is also
the "Lender." The "Lender" is no longer a party to this action and has taken no action to protect
its interest under the deed of trust.
Appellant, upon prevailing in this appeal, is entitled to an award of attorney fees and
costs.
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vu.
CONCLUSION

Despite the Court's rulings in Trotter and Edwards, based upon the record in this case,
Appellant is entitled to present his case to the jury.

The district court's grant of summary

judgment to the Defendant should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for jury
trial on Plaintiffs negligence and consumer protection causes of action.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June 2013.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certified that on this 19th day of June 2013, a true and correct
copy of the APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was served upon opposing counsel as follows:
Michael G. Halligan
Sussman Shank LLP
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400
Portland, OR 97205-3089

- - US Mail

_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile
E-mail

-~

~~

RUN FT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

\1 <5ttJ

.
_ _J_O_N_M_.~s~\-E-E-LE~~~~~
Attorney for Appellant
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Appendix 1

Filed: June 6, 2013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BART G. BRANDRUP
and JESSICA D. BRANDRUP,
husband and wife,
Plc1 in tiffs,
v.

RECONTRUST COiVIPANY, N.A.:
BANK OF /\Jv1ERICA, N.A.,
successor by merger with BAC Home Loans Servicing. LP:
TH.E BANK OF NEW YORK l'v1ELLON,
fka The Bank of NeYv York .
as Trnstee for The Certificate Holders Cwa lt. Inc ..
Alternative Loan Trnst 2006-2CB. ivfortgage Pass-throngh Cettificat es;
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEJvIS,INC. ,
Defendants.
United States District Court 31 1CV1390HZ

RUSSELL R. PO\VELL
and D IANE L. POWE LL,
husband and 'Nife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

RECONTRUST CO~fPANY. N .A .:
BANK OF AI\1ERICA, N .A ,
successor by merger with BAC Home Loans Servic ing, LP :
THE BANK OF NE\V YORK l\llELLON,
fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for The Certi.fi cale Holders Cwalt , Inc .
Alternat ive Loan Trust 200 7-0HJ ,
Mortgage Pass-through Certificates. series 2007-0H 3:
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC R EGISTRATION SYSTEMS,INC. .
Defendants.
U nited States District Court 311 CV1 399HZ

DEANIRA 1\1A "YO
and REYNALDA PAEZ PLANCARTE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

RECONTRUST C01'vfPANY, N.A.:
BANK OF Atv1ERICA, N.A.,
sHccessor by merger with Bae Home Loans Servicing, LP:
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COivIPAN'{,
as Trustee for the Certificate llolders of the 1\!Iorpm Stanley ABS Capital L Inc ...
Trust 2005-HE2,
j\fortgage Pass-through Certificates . Series 2005-HE2:
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION S'{STEMSJNC..
Defendants.
United States District Court 311CVI533SI

OMID MIRARABSHAHI,
Plaintiff,
\!.

RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.:
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
successor by 1nerger with Bae llome Loans Servicing, LP:
'!TIE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
lka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for The Certificate Ifolclers of C\VMBS, INC.,
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-4,
l\fortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2007-4:
aucl lvfORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION S'i"STEMSJNC.,
Defendants.
Uuited States District Court 3 l 2CVOO l OHA
(SC S06028 l)
Eu Banc
On certified questions from the United States District Court; certification order
elated April 2, 2012, certification accepted July 19, 2012, argued and submitted January 8,
2013.

2

Jeffrey A. l'vfyers. BO\vles Fernnndez Law LLC, Lake Oswego, argued the cm1se
for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. !vf yers, John Bowles. and Rick
Fernnndez.
Gregory A Chairnov, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland argued the cause for
defendant Mortgage Electronic Rcgistrntion Systems, Inc. With hin1 on the brief were
Kevin H. Kono. Frederick B. Burnside. and P. Andrevv l'vfcStay, Jr.. Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, Portlm1d.
Thmuas iv!. Hefferon, Goodwin Proctor LLP, Wnshi11gto11 DC, argued the cause
for defendants ReconTrust Company, N.A.; Bank of America, N.A .: The Bank of New
York Mellon; and Deutsche Bank National Trnst Company. With him 011 the brief were
Steven A. Ellis, Washington DC. and Thomas W. Sondag. Pilar C. French. and Peter D.
Hawkes. Lane Powell PC. Portland.
Rolf C. l\1oan. Assistm1t Attorney General. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney GenernL
and A1111a M. Joyce, Solicitor General. filed a brief on behalf of omiclfs c lfrioe State of
Oregon.
Nanina D. Taki a, Law Office of Phil Golclsrnith, Portland. filed a brief on behalf
of an1ic11s c uriae Oreg.on Trial Lawyers Associatiou.
Sara Kobak, W l\1ichael Gillette. a11d Jordan Silk, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt,
PC, Po1ila11d, filed a brief on behalf of amic11s rnriae Oreg.on Land Title Associa tion.
Thomas W Brown, Thomas rvL Christ , and Robert E. Sabido, Cosgrave Vergeer
Kester LLP, Port land, riled a brief 011 behalf of amici curiae f'viortgate Bankers
Association, Oregon Bankers Association, and lndependeut Community Banks of
Oregon.
BRE\VER, J.

Certified questions nnswcred.
Kistler. .J.. concurred in pmt and dissented in part, an filed an opi11io11 in vvliich
Balmer. C.L joined.

3

BREWER . .l.
2

These cases come before this court

011

four certified ques tions of lavv from

3

the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. See Br(1nrlrup v. Recon Trust

4

Co ., 352 Or 320, 287 P3d 423 (20 I 2) (accepti11g certified questions): ORS 28.200 to

:'i

28 .25.'i (providing procedure for certifying questions to the Oregon Supreme Court and

6

authorizing. court to answer cert iried quest ions) . The qllestions a II are co11cernecl with a

7

practice that has arise11 in the home mortgage industry i11 the last twe11t y years -- that of

8

dratting mortgages and trust deeds so that a certain De laware corpon1tio1L l'vfortgagc

9

Electronic Reg istrntion Systems, Inc. (MERS ). rather than the lender. is identified as the

l0

security ins trument's "mortgagee" or "ben e fi ciary." That practice all o\l\1S lenders and

11

other entities dcali11g in home loans to track their transactions in a data base lllaintained by

12

!VIERS . 111 Oregon, the prnctice has come u11dcr scrnti11y in a number of foreclosnre cases

13

aris ing u11der the Oregon Trus t Deed A ct (OTDA ), ORS 86 .705 to ORS 86.795.
As will be explained more full y below, the OTDA prov ides an alt ernative

14
lS

to the trnditio11al jltclicial foreclosure process that is available only when the hom e loan is

16

secured by a trust deed, and, even then, onl y when certain conditions arc satis fi ed. One

17

co11ditio11 for

18

the trust deed "bene fi c iary" be recorclecl in the real propert y records of the county where

19

the encumbered property is s ituated. O RS 86. 73 5(1 ). Some ho meowners threa tened w ith

20

foreclosure under th e OTDA have recognized that, alt hough the ori g ina l lenders

21

trans ferred their int eres ts to other part ies, the changes i11 benefi c ia l o wners hip \Vere not

22

recorded in the real proper ty records o f th e counties where their properti es are situated.

forecl os in~

under the OTDJ\ is that "any asSif!,Illllents" of the trust deed by

Those homemvners have resisted foreclosure under the OTDA on the ground that the
2

transfers were not recorded. They argue. h1ter alio. that ORS 86.735(1) requires the

3

recording of any assignment of a trnst deed by the owner of the beneficial interest in the

4

trust deed and that the identification of Iv1ERS as the trust deed "beneficiary" is

5

ineffective.

6

Some cases filed in Oregon state courts that have raised these issues have

7

been removed to federal court, and the judges \Vithi11 the District of Oregon have used

8

differing analyses and reached differing conclusions. See, e.g.. Sm·ereign v. Deutsche

9

Bank. 856 F Supp 2d 1203 (D Or 2012): James v. R.econTrusr Co .. 845 F Supp 2d 1145

10

(D Or 2012); Reeves v. R.econTrusl Co., 8116 F Supp 2d I 149 (D Or 2012); Heyer v. Bank

11

ofAmerica, 800 F Supp 2d I 157 (D Or 2011 ). Recognizing that the issues turn

12

pi oper co11struction of Oregon statutes and that this court is the ultimate arbiter of such

13

matters. the district court in these cases certified the following questions to this court:
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14
15
16

Certified Question No. 1: May an entity, such as l'v1ERS, that is
neither a lender nor successor to a lender, be a 'beneficiary' as that term is
used in the Oregon Trust Deed Act?

17
18
19
20
21
22

Certified Question No. 2: May Iv1ERS be designated as beneficiary
u11der the Oregon Trnst Deed Act \Vhere the trust deed provides that tvfERS
"holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrmver in this Security
Iustrument. but, if necessary to co1nply with lavv or custom. l\IERS (as
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to
exercise any or all of those interests"?

23
24
2.5
26

Certified Question No. 3: Does the transfer of a promissory note
from the lender to a successor result in an automatic assignment of the
securing trust deed that must be recorded prior to the commencement of
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under ORS 86.735(1)?

27

Certified Question No 4: Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow

2

the

2
3

ivfERS to retai11 and tnmsfer lega l title to a trust deed as nominee for the
lender, after the not e secured by the trust deed is trnnsfened from the fernier
to a successor or series of successors?

4

\Ve accepted the district court's certification and allowed the parties in th e federal cases to

5

present their viev.rs. We answer those questions -- in two instances as reframed -- as

6

follows :

7
8
9
10
ll

(1) "No." For purposes of ORS 86.73 5(1), the "beneficiary" is the lender
to whom the obligation that the trnst deed sec ures is owed or the
lend er's s uccessor in interest. Thus. an entit y like l\!ERS, which is not
a lender. may not be a trus t d eed's "beneficiary," unless it is a lender's
successor in interest.

12

(2) We refrnrne the second question as follows:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
/"
~ -'

24

25
26
27

28
29

30
31
32

34

35
36

Is 1\1ERS ehg ib/e to serve as beneficiary under the Oregon Trust Deed
Act where the trust deed provides that l'vIERS "holds onl y legal title to
the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrnment , but, if
necessa ry to comply vvith lmv or custom, 1vfERS as nominee for
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right : to exercise
any or all of those interests"')
A nswer: "No." A ''beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA is the
person to whom the obligation that the tru st deed secures is owed. At
the time of origination, that p erson is the lender. The trust deeds in
these cases designate the lender as the benefic iary, when they provide:
"This Security Instrument secures to Lender : (i) the repayment of the
loan, and all renewals, extensions and m odifications of the note; and
(ii) the performance of borrO\ver's covenant s and agreeme11ts under
this securit y ins trument and the note." Because the provision that
MERS "ho lds only leg.al tit le to the interes ts granted by Bonovver 111
this Secmity Instrument, but_ if necessary to comply with law or
custom , l'vIERS * * * has the right to exercise any or all of those
interests," does not convey to rvfERS the beneficial right to repayment,
the inclusion of that provision does not a lter the trust deed's
des ignation of the lender as the "beneficiary'' or make l'vfERS elig ible
to serve in that capacity .
(3) "No." ORS 86. 735(1) does not require record a tion of "assig nments"
of a trust deed by opera tion of law that res ult from the tra ns fer of the
seemed obligation.

(4) \Ve answer th e qu es tion. as rcfrmncd below, in two parts :

2
3
4
S

(tl)(a) "Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allmv l'vlERS to hold and transfer
legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured
by the trust deed is transfeITecl from the lender to a su ccessor or seri es of
successo rs?"

6
7

12

Answer: "No." For prnvoses of the OTDA, the only pertinent interests in
the trnst deed are the beneficial interes t of the ben eficiary and the legal
interest of the trustee. MERS holds neithe r of those interests in these cases,
and. therefore, it cannot hold or transfer lega l title to the tru s t deed. For
purposes of our answer to the first part of the fourth certified question, it is
immaterial whether til e note secured by the tru st deed has previously been
"trn11sfe rrecl from th e lender to a succ essor or seri es of successors."

13
14
IS
16

('l)(b) "Does MER S nevertheless have authority as an agent fo r the
original lender and its successors in interest to act on their behalves with
respect to the transfer of the beneficial interest in the trust deed or the
nonjudicial foreclosure process?"

8

9
10
l l

l7
18
19
20
21
22

Answer: The power to tran sfer th e beneficial interes t in a trnst deed or to
foreclose it follows the beneficial interest in the trn st deed. The beneficiary
or its successor in interest holds those rights. IvJERS's authority, if any, to
perform any act in the foreclosure process there fore must derive from the
original beneficiary and its successors in interest. We are unable to
determine the existence, scope, or extent of any such authority 011 the
record before us.

23
24

As a preface to onr explanation of those answers, we set out the following lega l and

25

factual background.

26
27
28

I.BACKG ROUND

A.

1\Iortgoges, Ii·ust Deeds, and the Oregon frust Deed Act
\Vhen a person borrows money to purchase a home, in Oreg.on as

29

elsewhere, the Imm u suall y is m e mori ali zed in a promi ssory note that contains the

30

borrower's \vritten. unconditional promise to pay certain stuns at a specified time or

31

tirn es. Ge11crnlly, th e borrower and lender a lso enter into a separa tely- memoriali zed

4

security agreement -- a mortgage or. more commonly in Oregon. a trnst deed. See
2

generalzr Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman. Real Estote Finance Lmv §§ 2. L 5.27. 5.28

3

(5th ed 2007): Joseph L. Dunne. Enforcing the Oregon Trust Deed Act, 49 \Villarnette L

4

Rev 77. 81-85 (2012). Oregon subscribes to the "lien theory," rather than the ''title

S

theory." of mortgages. Under the title theory. the borrower conveys actual title to the

6

burde11ed property to the le11der lo secure the obligation to repay. Under the lien theory.

7

the borrower merely conveys a "right. upon co11ditio11 broken. to have the mortgage

8

foreclosed and the mortgagee! property sold to satisf)r [the underlying debt]." Sch!eefv.

9

P11rt~1·.

107 Or 71. 78. 214 P 13 7 ( 1923 ). Thus. in the traditional security arrangement --

10

the mortgage -- the borrmver conveys to the lender a lien on the property being

11

purchased. to secure the promise to repay that is contained in a promissory note. If the

12

borrower defaults on the note. the lender, or the lender's successor in interest. may

13

exercise its right to sell the property to satisfy the obligation. but it must do so by

14

bringing a judicial action against the borrower. Id at 75- 79: ORS 88.010 (except as

1S

otherwise provided by law. lien upon real property shall be foreclosed by a suit).

I6

The OTDA, Or Laws 1959. ch 625. codified at ORS 86. 705 to ORS 86. 795.

17

was e11acled in 1959 to provide an alternative to the judicial foreclosure process. Ronald

18

Brady Tippetts, Note, Mortages

19

( 1965). That nonjudicial alternative is available wheu the parties use a trust deed to

20

secure the loan. A trust deed is a deed executed under the OTDA that "conveys an

21

interest in real property to a trustee m tmst to secure the performance of an obligation the

22

gnmtor or other person nmned in the deed o\ves to a beneficiary." ORS 86. 705(7). The

Tmst Deeds· in Oregon. 44 Or L Rev 1119. 149-50

OTDA permits the trustee appointed under a trust deed to advertise ancl sell the property
2

to the highest bidder \vithout judicial involvement. ORS 86.710; ORS 86.755. Like a

3

mortgage, a trust deed creates a lien on real property to secure an underlying obligation in

4

the event of a default. See ORS 86. 705(7); see also Sam Paulsen Afasom:r v. Higley, 276

5

Or 107 I. l 075, 557 P2d 676 ( 1976) (mortgage or trust deed creates only lien on real

6

property). IndeecL a trnst deed creates

7

beneficial iuterest. First a trust deed "conveys an interest in real property to a trustee in

8

trust to secure the performance of an obligation." ORS 86. 705(7). That legal interest

9

includes the pm,ver to sell the obligated property in the manner prescribed in the statute

10

on the grantor's default. ORS 86.710. However, if the trustee utilizes its pcnver of sale,

11

the proceeds of the sale. after expenses, must be applied "to the obligation secured by the

12

trust deed" -- that is. to satisfy the obligation that the borrower owes to the beneficiary.

13

ORS 86.765(2). Accordingly, the trustee holds and exercises its legal interest in the

14

encumbered property for the benefit of the trust deed's "beneficiary" -- the person "named

15

or otherwise designated in [the] trust deed as the person for whose benefit [the] trnst deed

16

is given." ORS 86. 705( l). The second mteresl that is created by a trust deed -- the

17

beneficial or equitable i11terest in the lien granted thereiu -- thus is held by the

18

beneficiary. That interest is the security for the performance of the obligation that is

19

owed to the beneficiary. ORS 86.705(7).

20

111.·o

distinct interests -- a legal interest and a

A trustee 1nay conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale only when certain

21

conditions are satisfied. See ORS 86. 735 (setting out conditions). Those conditions

22

include: (I) recording of "[t]he trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the
6

trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee*

* * in the

2

mortgage records of the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated."

3

ORS 86. 735( l ): (2) a default on the obligation, "the performance of\vhich is secured by

4

the trust deed," ORS 86.735(2): (3) recording of a notice of default containing the

5

trustee's or beneficiary's election to sell the property to satisfy the obligation. ORS

6

86.735(3): and (:I) the absence ofa11y pending or co1npleted action for recovery of the

7

debt with limited exceptions. S'ee, e.g, ORS 86.735(4).

8

In addition to those conditions. the OTDA prescribes notice requirements

9

that protect trust deed grantors from unauthorized nonjudicial foreclosures and sales of

l0

property. Among other things, a trustee is required to provide to the grnntor and other

11

interested parties at least 120 days' advance notice of the trustee's sale. ORS 86.7110(1).

12

Although judicial involvement is not required to complete a foreclosure by advertisement

13

and sale, the 120-clay advance notice period gives a grantor time to seek judicial

14

intervention in certain circumstances. as plaintiffs in these cases have clone.

15

The grantor has a right to cure the default at any time up to five days

16

before the date lasl set for the sale. ORS 86.753. If the trustee has co111plicd \Vith the

17

statutory notice requirclllcnts and the default is not cured, the trnstee may sell the

18

prope11y at a public auction to the highest bidder Yvithout judicial oversight. ORS 86.755.

19

In contrast to the judicial foreclosure process, a grnntor has no statutory right to redeem

20

the property afler a completed trustee's sale. Compare ORS 88.080 (providing right of

21

redemption a fl er sale) with ORS 86. 770( I) (trustee's sale forecloses and terminates

22

interests in property of any perso11 to whom required notice of the sale was given). After
7

a trustee's sale. the trustee must execute and deliver a trustee's deed to the purchaser,
2

\Vhich must recite details of the foreclosure. ORS 86. 77 5. If the trustee's deed is

3

recorded in the pertinent county records. the facts recited in the deed are considered

4

primafocie evidence of the truth of the matters set forth therein. and are conclusive in

5

favor of a purchaser for value who relies on them in good faith. ORS 86. 780.
Of course. on! y a small portion of the property transact ions involving trust

6
7

deeds end in foreclosure. lf tbe borrower repays the loan secured by the trust deed in foll.

8

the trustee must "reconvey the estate of real property described i11 the trust deed" (that is,

9

release the lien on the property) to the borroweL ORS 86. 720. and that reconveyance may

l0

be publicly recorded in the pertinent real property records .

11

B.

.'1ssignmen/ ond Recording of Trust Deeds

12

:rv1ortgages or trust deeds may be transferred in a variety of ways. By

13

statute. mortgages may be "assigned by an instrnment in writing." and such written

14

assignments may be recorded in the pertinent real property records. ORS 86.060

15

("mortoaoes
mav
bv
0
t"'
_, be assio11ed
t"'
./ an instnunent in writino

16

records of niortgages
of the countv"' where the land is situated").
,__ "

17

have been held to "follow" the promissory notes that they secure so that. by operation of

18

law. the sale or transfer of a promissory note effects an equitable transfer of the mortgage

~

* * * and
'

1

recorded in the

But mortgages also
\..-,

(._

Although that statute initially was enacted with 1nortgages iu mincL it
applies equally to trust deeds. 5'ee ORS 86.715 ("a trust deed is deemed to be a mortgage
on real property and is subject to all lmvs relating to mortgages 011 real property except to
the extent that such laws are inconsistent with [the OTDAJ").

8

that secures that note. Bamberger v. Geiser, 2 1 Or 203, 206-07. 33 P 609 (1893) ("vvhere
1

2

a debt is secured by mortgage. the debt is the principal and the mortgage is the incident

3

and

4

Loder, 47 Or 223. 229. 81 P 778 (1905) (same). 1

5

* * * an assign111e11 t of the debt

is an assignment of the mortgage"): Barringer v.

Although the recordation of a mortgage or trnst deed assignment generally

6

is not required to make the transfer legally effective between the parties. it is necessary

7

and desirable for protecting an assignee's iuterest under the security instrument against a

8

purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. See TVillamette Col & Credit 5'en· v.

9

Gray. 157 Or 77. 83. 70 P2d 39 ( 1937) (assignee of mortgage was not obliged to take and

10

record \vritten assignrnent to acquire title as between immediate parties but was required

11

to do so to maintain lien against innocent purchaser): see also ORS 93.640 (every

12

conveyance. deed, or assignment affecting au interest in real property \Vhich is not

13

recorded as provided by law is void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith for

14

valuable consideration). The recorclation of a trust deed assignment is necessary for an

15

additional reason: As described above,

16

"any assignments of the trnst deed by the trustee or the beneficiary" must be recorded

l7

the relevant land records before the nonjudicial foreclosure procedure set out at ORS

18

86.740 - ORS 86.755 may be invoked. ORS 86.735(1).

19

c

Or at

(slip op at 6- 7), the trust deed and
Ill

Ihe J\1ERS Corporation

Again, that principle applies equally \vhen the promissory note is secured
by a trust deed; the trust deed follows the note by operation of Imv.

9

MERS is a creature of the real es tat e finance industry. In the micl-l 990's,
2

large players in the industry. including the Federal National ivfortgage Association

3

(Fannie Mae) and th e F eclernl Home Loan i\fortgage Co1voratio11 (Fred die !vfac}, decided

ii

to create a dntabase that wo uld electronic() ll y tra ck ownership in secured rea l estate loans

)

as they were bought ancl so ld in a secouclmy market. genera ll y in packages now k now n as

6

mortgage-backed sec urities. R. K. Arnold, Yes, lhere is Life 0 11 MERS. 11 Prob & Prop

7

33, 33-3L1 ( 1997). They created ME R SCorp Holdings, a "111e111ber-lrnsed organiza tio n

8

made up of thousa nds o f lenders, serv icers. sub-servicers. investors and government

9

institutions ." See k!ERSCORP Holdings, Inc., http://\V\NW. m ersinc.org/about-us/ foq

10

(accessed l'vlay 22 , 201 3). T he primary product ofMERSCorp Holdings was and is the

11

"MERS System," a "national electronic database that tracks changes in mortgage

12

servicing: and beneficial ownership interests in loans secured by 1eside11tial rea l estate."

13

id.

14

B ut there is another s ig nificant aspect of MERS; that entit y serves as the

lS

designated mortgagee or beneficiary, as the no minee of the lender, for all m ortgages and

16

trust deeds registe red in the MERS Sys te111 . Id C hri stopher L. Peterso n, Foreclosw e,

17

S11bprime /_ ending, ond the Alortgoge Electronic Registration S)·stem , 78 U C in ci11I1a ti L

18

Rev 1359, 136 1-62 (2009). MERS, h owever. does no t m ake, serv ice. or invest in loa ns.

19

Id at 1371.

20

D.

21
22

The Tm st D eeds· nnd Plnint[ffs' Challenges
The cert ifie d questions that m e before this cou rt arise out of fonr separat e

actions challeng ing a trus tee's attempt to no njudicia lly foreclose a trus t deed securing
10

residential property. In each case. homeo\v11ers (collectively. "plaintiffs") financed the
2

purchase of a residence in Oregon with a loan from a lender that is a member of MERS.
In each case. the homeowners signed ( 1) a promissory note pledging to repay the money

4

borrowed. plus interest. according to a prescribed schedule and by a specified date, and
(2) a "Deed of Trust." granting to a named trustee the property they had purchased with

6

the loan. "i11 trust. with pcnver of sale," to secure the payment of the prornissory note and

7

other related promises.

8
9
10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
/"

-·'

24

25
26

27
28
29

30
31

Except for the names and property descriptions. the trust deeds iu the four
cases are identical. In a "definition" section. each trust deed identifies the "Borrower."
"Lender" and "Trustee" by name, and then sets

0111

the following definition of "MERS":

"':rvfERS' is Ivfortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. !VIERS is
a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and
Le11der's successors and assigns. tv!ERS is the beneficiary under this
Security Instrument."
In a section entitled "Transfer of Rights in the Property." the trust deed states:
"The bene.flcimy of this Securiry Instrument is AfERS ('wlely as
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the
successors and assigns of AfER5'. 771is Security Instrument secures to
Lender: (i) the repayment c~f the Loan, ond oil renewals, extensions and
modiflcarions l~f the Note, and (ii) the pe1forma11ce <~/Borrower's covemmts
and agreeme11rs um/er rhis Security l11stn11nenf and the Note. For this
purpose. Borro\Ner irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee. in trust.. with
power of sale. the following described property* * * . [t]ogether with all
the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all
easements. appurtenances. and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the
property. All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this
Security Instrnme11t. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security
Instrnment as the Property. Borrmver understands and agrees that AIERS
holds on/v
leool title lo the inreres/s oranted bi· Borrmver in this Securilr
.,,
!11stn1111enr, but, if·necessm:l' to comp(v with low or cusrom, 1'IER5' (as
nominee for Le11der and Le11der s successors ond assigns) has the right: to
~".:!

<.'"::>

1

Il

"'

•'

2
3
4

5
6

exercise 011y or ol/ of those interests, incl11ding, but not limited to, the right
to foreclose and sell the Property, and to take any action required of
Lender including, bur not lilnired to, releasing and canceling rhis Sec11rity
lnsrrumenf.
(Emphases added.)
Those provisions appear to turn the traditional three-party trust deed

7

arrangement -- debtor/grantor, trnstee, and lender/ beneficiary -- into a four-party

8

arrangement_ with the functional role of the beneficiary being split between two entities.

9

Althoug h the benefit of the trust deed is reserved to the "Lender" (because the trust deed

IO

"secures to the Lender" the o bligations of repayment and performance of other

11

covenants), M ERS purport s to be the beneficiary "as nominee for Lender and Lender' s

12

successors and assigns
-.. ."

13

Plaintiffs in all four cases signed the promissory notes and trust d eeds as

14

described . amL aft er a period of years, allegedly defa11lted on their loans. Following. each

15

default, rvIERS executed a written assignment of the trust deed to the reputed ultimate

16

successor in interest of the orig inal lender and recorded that ass ignment in the pertinent

17

real property records. Each of those assignees then appoi11ted a new trnstee. ReconTrns t

18

Company.NJ\ .. and that assignme nt also was recorded. Thereafter, Reco11Tru st as

19

trnstee. commenced the process of nonjudi cial foreclo sure u11der each trn st deed, iss11i11g

,..,
20
21

22

no ti ces of tlte grantor's d efault and the tn1stee's electi on to sell.
In a ll four cases. plainti ffs brought a11 action in stat e court aga ins t
ReconTrnst, rvfERS, and the reput ed ultimate successor in interest of their orig inal le nder,
seeki11p. to enj oi n tlte nonjudic ial foreclosure proceedi11g on a mnnbe r of g rounds.

12

including that (I) a condition for nonjudicial foreclosure had not been satisfied -2

specifically, the requirement in ORS 86. 735( I) that any assignments of the trust deed by

3

the "beneficiary" be publicly recorded in the pe11inent real property records; and (2)

4

MERS's purp011ed assignment of the trust deed to the reputed ultimate successor in

S

interest was ineffective. because, at the time of the purported assignment "the principal

6

f()r whom l\fERS pmported to act as 'beneficiary' did not hold plaintiff's loan at that

7

date." Defendants removed the cases to federal court. and then filed motions to dismiss

8

under FRCP 12 (b)(6). arguing. that MERS was the lawful beneficiary under the trust

9

deeds. that all assignments of the trust deeds by the named "beneficiary." IvIERS. had

IO

been recorded, and that ORS 86. 735( 1) did not require assignments of the trnst deeds by

l l

the lenders to be recorded. The federal district court certified the questions set out above

12

to this court. \.Ve consider the questions in order.

13

II. FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION

14
1S

"May an entity. such as :tvfERS, that is neither a lender nor successor
to a lender, be a 'beneficiary' as that term is used in the Oregon Trust Deed
Act?"

16

17

This question is one of statutory construction. which we approach using the

18

methodolo_gy described in Srore v. Gaines, ::H6 Or 160. 206 P3cl I ()112 (2009). We focus

19

first

20

that we find useful. and proceed to general maxims of statutory construction if the

21

legislature's intent remains obscure. Id. ar 171-72. The pertinent text

22

"beneficiary" that appears in ORS 86. 705:

011

the text, coutext, and any legislative history brought to our atteution by the parties

the definition of

"As used in ORS 86. 705 to 86. 795 [that is, the Ore_gon Trust Deed
13

Act]:

2
3
4

5
6

"*

****

"(2) 'Beneficiary' means a person named or otherwise designated in a
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or the
person's successor in interest and who is not the trustee unless the
3
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under ORS 86. 790(1 )(cl)."

7

There is no dispute about the meaning of the last clause. Rather, the parties square off

8

over the meaning of the requirements that the person (I) be "named or otherwise

9

designated in [theJ trust deecL" (2) "as the person for whose benefit the trust deed is

10

given° Taking the latter phrase first. the "benefit" of a trust deed is the security it

11

provides with respect to an obligation owed by the grantor to the beneficiary. That is

12

made clear in many of the surrounding statutes. For example, as notecC the term "trust

13

deed" is defined as "a deed exec11tecl in conformity with ORS 86.705 to 86. 795 that

14

conveys au interest i11 real property to a trnstee in trust to secure the pe1formonce of an

IS

obligation the grrmtor or other person named in the deed owes to a beneficiary." ORS

We use the current version of the statute. \Vhich is numbered differently but
does not othenvise vary materially from the version in effect when the pariies signed the
trust deeds. That version, ORS 86.705 (2005). provided:
"As Hsed in ORS 86.705 - 86.795, unless the context requires
or hen vise:

"( l) 'Beneficiary' means the person named or otherwise designated
iu a trust deed as the person for whose beuerit a trust deed is ?iven, or the
person's successor in interest. aud who shnll 1101 be the trustee unless the
beneficiary is qualified to be a trnstee under ORS 86. 790(1 )(d)."
(Differences in italics.)

14

86. 705(7) (emplrnsis added). Similarly, "gnmlor" is defined as "the person that conveys

2

an interest in real property by a trust deed as securityjcJr the pe1for111ance 0/011

3

obligation." ORS 86.705(4) (emphasis added). Finally, ORS 86.710, which genern lly

4

describes the power of a trustee to no11judicially foreclose, begins with a genern l

)

description of a trust deed: "Transfers in trust of an interest in real property may be made

6

10

7

deed, 10 o beneficim:r. " (Emphasis added .) Thus, tlie person "for \vhose benefit the trust

8

deed is given" is the person to whom the grantor owes an obligation. the performance of

9

which the trust deed secures.

secure the p e1:fon11011ce (~f rm obligatio n r~fa g rr111tor. or any other person named in the

10

That analysis, hovvever, speaks onl y to the second hal f of the wording or

I1

the definition. Plaintiffs suggest that the initial phrase "tl1e person uarned or otherwise

12

desiguated as" means that the trust deed must ide11tifY (name or otherwise designate) the

13

persou who meets the definition of "beneficiary" as that term is used in the statute.

14

Defendants contend, to the contrary, that the legislature used that phrase to signify that

15

that the parties to the trust deed could agree to "name" or "designate" whomever they

16

chose to serve "as" beneficiary -- and that , for pmposes of ORS 86. 705(2), the

I7

"benefi ciary" would be the person so desipiated. Thus. as uefendants conceive it ,

18

clesig.rn1tion of a beneficiary is purely a matter of contract. Plaintiffs' contrary

19

interpretation. defendants assert, essentially turns the initial phrase of the defi11ition into

20

surplusage, violating a fundamental principle of statutory construction set out at ORS

21

17:1.0 IO: that is, " 110 1 *

22

* * to omit what has been inserted ."

We do not agree that plainti ffs' reading removes the phrase "1rnmed or
15

otherwise designated as" from the statute. As noted above, plaintiffs read the statutory

2

definition as providing that, in addition to being the person "for whose benefit the trnst

3

deed is given," the beneficiary must be "named or otherwise designated" as such in rhe

4

rmst deed. That reading uses all of the words of the statute. Indeed. we find plaintiffs'

5

reading of the definition to be more compelling. on a purely textunl level. than

6

defendauts'. If defendant's reading were correct. then anyone -- even a persou with no

7

connection to or interest in the transaction at all -- could be designated in the agreement.

8

If the legislature had intended "beneficiary" to have the circular meaning that defendants

9

suggest -- that "beneficiary" means \Vhomever the trust deed names as the "beneficiary" --

I0

it would have had no reason to include any description or the beneficiary's functional role

11

in the trust arrangement The fact that the statute does include such a description ("the

12

person for whose benefit the trust deed is given") strongly suggests that the legislature

I3

intended to define "beneficiar[ies]'' by their functional role. 11ot their clesig11ation. Stated

14

differently. by including such a functional description. it is apparent that the legislature

15

intended that the beneficiary of the trust deed be the person to whom the obligation that

l6

the trust deed secmes is owed.

17

As discussed. in a typical resiclcutial trust deed trausactiou. the obligation

18

secured by the trust deed is memorialized in a pronussory note that contains a borrower's

19

promise to repay a home loan to a lender. At inception. the lender is the person who is

20

entitled to repayment of the note and. thus, functionally is "the person for \vhose benefit

2l

the trust deed is given." That person's "sllccessor in interest" whom ORS 86. 705(2) also

22

recognizes as a beneficiary. is a person \Vho succeeds to the lender's rights.
16

Defendants contend that another provision of the OTDA ORS 86. 720(3),
2

undermines that construction of ORS 86. 705(2). ORS 86. 720 addresses the circumstance
in which the obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, but either the

4

beneficim)' or trustee has foiled or refused to release the trust deed. In such a
circumstance. where a tit le insurance company or insurance producer has satisfied the

6

obligation thro11gh an escrow, ORS 86. 720(1) authorizes the insurer. in a backup role. to

7

issue and record a release of the trnst deed to clear title. In that context. ORS 86.720(3)

8

provides:

9
10

11
12

13
14
15

"Prior to the issuance and recording of a release [of the lien upon
perfrmnance of the obligation secured by the trust deed], the title insurance
con1pany or insmance producer shall give notice of the intention to record a
release of tmst deed to the beneflcimy of record and, ifdifferen!, the party
to 1vhom the.fir!/ satisfaction was made."
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants assert that the emphasized text shows that the legislature

16

understood that the "beneficiary" need not be the lender or the lender's successor in

17

interest. \Ve do not agree that the statutory text necessarily -- or even probably -- bears

18

such a construction. It is equally. if not more plausible. to conclude that the phrase "if

19

different. the party to whom the full satisfaction \Vas rnade." was meant mstead to

20

acknowledge the circumstance where a lender's successor in iuterest is not the

21

beneficiary "of recorcL" but is entitled to repayment of the underlying obligation.

22

Ironically. that is precisely the circumstance that defendants assert permissibly occurred
in these cases and that is the subject of the third certified question discussed belmv.

24

When the statute is viewed in that ligJ1L it reinforces the conclusion that the beneficiary is
17

the lender or the lender's successor in interest. In short, ORS 86.720(3) docs not furnish
2

persuasive context that supports defendants' proposed meaning of the term "beneficiary"

3

under the OTDA.

4

Defendants next contend that the statutory mem1ing of "beneficiary" must

5

be interpreted in the context of common lavv principles of agency. freedom of contracL

6

and coJ11mercial law Defendants point to case law showing that Oregon recognizes that

7

an agent, even one without a pecuniary interest. may engage in land transactions and hold

8

title on behalf of <l principal. See, e.g. Halleck,._ Halleck et of.. 216 Or 23. 38. 33 7 P2d

9

330 ( 1959) ("'Conveyances of lands

* * * may be made b.Y deed.

signed by the person

**

10

*or by his lawful agent'") (quotingj(mner ORS 93.010)); Bowns v. Bowns. 184 Or 603,

1I

613. 200 P2d 586 ( 19,18) (estate or interest in real property may be transferred by one's

12

"'lawful agent. under \vritten authority"') (q11otingj(m11er ORS 93.020)); Kern

I3

Howling. 27 Or 205. 207. 40 P 168 (1895) (note aml mortgage executed to member of

14

brokerage firm as agent for principal). 1 Defendants also point to the "bedrock" principle

15

that "contracts. when entered into freely and voluntarily. shall be held sacred and shall be

16

enforced by courts." unless contrary to soI11e "overpoweriug rule of pllblic policy."

17

McDonnol ond AfcDonnal. 293 Or 772, 779. 652 P2d 12,17 (1982) (quoting Feves v.

18

Feves. 198 Or 151. 159-60, 25!1P2d694 (1953)). Defendants assert that proper

1·

Defendants also cite a federal case, In re Cllshmon Bnke1:v. 526 F2d 23, 30
(1st Cir 1975) cer! den. 425 US 937 (1976) for the proposition that a lien may be
recorded in the name of a nominee.

18

consideration of those common l(jw principles in iuterpreting the trust deed statutes
2

supports their reading that ORS 86.735(1) allmvs someone other tlrnn an obligee to be the

3

"beneficiary," either because the parties have freely and voluntarily agreed to designate

4

someone else as the beneficiary or because the obligee has chosen to have someone

5

its agent or nominee. Ivfore specifically -- although the premise is implicit -- the core of

6

defendants' "freedom of contract" argument appears to be that. although J'vlERS has no

7

right to repayment of the notes in these cases. it uevertheless may be designated by

8

contract as the beneficiary for other functions. in particular those functions relating to the

9

control of the foreclosure process.

CICI

as

10

We disagree. The resolution of this question does not hinge on the parties'

11

intent: rather, it depends on legislative intent. That is. the OTDA authorizes nonjudicial

12

foreclosure only when certain statutory requirements are met. In these circumstances. the

13

rneaning of "beneficiary," as used in ORS 86. 735(1 ), is deten11i11ed by statute, and that

14

meaning is incorporated into, and cannot be altered by, the party's agreement. See, e.g.

lS

Ocean A. & G. Corp., Ltd v. Albina 1\1 I fVks., 122 Or 615, 617. 260 P 229 (1927) ("law

16

of the land applicable thereto is a part of every valid contract"): see also. R. Lord, l l

17

lVil/isron on Contracrs § 30:2:1 (ilth eel 1999) ("[i]ncorporation of cxislm?, law may act to

18

supersede inconsistent clauses purporting to define the terms oft he agreement. For

19

instance, where a statute regulates the amount the government is to pay for a particular

20

service. the statute controls despite a contract between the govermnent and the provider

21

of the service agreeing to a lower rate."). If the legislature had intended lo make the

22

parties' agreemeut paramount over the statute in this regard, it could have. and likely
19

would have. included an "unless otherwise <lgrecd" caveat, as it has in some statutes. See,
2

e.g. . ORS 72.3070 ("Unless orhen vise agreed. all goods called for by a contract for sale

3

must be tendered in a single delivery

4

it is unsurpris ing that it did not do so.

5

* * *. ").

But, in light of the structure of the OTDA,

The OTDA contemplntes a unitary beneficiary sta tus. so that the person

6

wit II the right to repayment of the Ullderl yi ng obligatio11 <llso controls the roreclosure

7

process. The interact ion of a number of statutory provisions demoustrates the point. For

8

example, ORS 86. 7 10 g ives the bene/lcimy the pO\ver to decide whether to foreclose

9

judicially

01

no11juclicially. Under ORS 86 .72 0. the beneficimy must request

10

reconvcym1cc alier the seemed obliga tion is sntislied. ORS 86.737(2)(b)(B) provides that

11

notice to the grant or o f a foreclosure sale 1.nust include "a te lephone number that will

12

allow the grn utor access during regular business lloms lo person-to-person consultatio11

13

with an individual authorized by the beneficiary to discuss the grantor's payment and loan

14

term negotiation and modification ." In addition, under ORS 86.745(1), a notice of sale

1.5

mnst include the name of the "beneficiary ." ORS 86.753(1) provides that the g,rantor

16

(and others) m ay cure a defaull before a foreclosure sale by making pay m ent. and payinµ

17

costs aud exprnses "to the beneficiary _" ORS 86.759(5) provides that sta tut ory

18

requirements that the trustee provide de fault and cure-related information to the grantor

19

and others "do not affect the duty o f beneficiaries to provide information to g rantors ."

20

Aud. significantl y. it is the ben efic iary alone who has authori ty to appoint a successor

21

trustee. ORS 86 .790(3). !11 sum. the integ rat ed effect of those provis ions presumes that

22

the collective rights and oblig ations tha t de fine bene fi c iary status are func tionall y unit ed:
20

that is. the person entitled to repayment of the secured obligation also controls the
2
3

foreclosure process.
That functional unity has longstanding roots in the common law itself A

4

flindamental principle in mortgage law holds that a foreclosing party must have the

5

power to enforce the underlying note. See United Srotes Not. Bank v. Holton, 99 Or 419.

6

/129, 195 P 823 ( 1921) ("It has ahvays been the l;nv of this state that the assignment of the

7

note carries the mortgage

8

which it is given to secure, is au umneaning ceremony."). That concern underlies the

9

standard doctrine in judicial foreclosure proceedings that the foreclosing party must

* * * The assignment of a mortgage independent of the debt

IO

provide proof that it has the power to enforce the note. See genera/Zr Alan l'vL White,

11

Losing the Paper -- J\fortgage Assignments, Note ha11sfers and Consmner Protection. 24

12

Loy Consumer L Rev 468, 4 76-77 (2012) (collecting cases).

13

Neither can the statutory meaning of "beneficiary" yield to an obligee's

14

decision to use another party as its agent or nominee. Although the cases and statutes

1S

cited by defendants shmv that a lawful agent can have broad authority to act on a trust

16

deed beneficiary's behalf in regard to the exercise of ri,eJ1ts under the trust deed. even to

17

the point of appearing on documents in the beneficiary's stead. the agent cannot become

18

the "beneficiary" for purposes of a statutory requirement that is defined. in part by the

19

status of the "beneficiary." To reinforce the point. the legislature. in recent amendments

20

to the OTDA, has plainly distinguished bet\veen a beneficiary and its agents in the

21

nonjudicial foreclosure context. See. e.g.. ORS 86. 735(<1) (reqlliring either "the

22

beneficiary or the beneficiary's agent" to certify compliance with statutory requirements
21

as a co11dition of 11onjndicial forcclosnre) .-~ Herc, the "beneficiary" to which ORS
2

86. 73 5( I) refers mus t be ''the person for whose benefit the trust deed [·was] given, " that is

3

(as discussed), the person to whom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed or

4

that person's successor in interest Dy the terms of the trust deeds at iss ue in these cases,

5

those persons me the lenders ("[t]his Securit y Instrnrnent secures to Lender: (i) the

6

repayment

7

interests to their agent s or nominees, the latter persons cannot become "benefi ciaries" for

8

purposes of the OTDA. 6

or the Loan") or their successors.

Unless the lenders have transferred such

7

Iu sum, our answer to the first question certified by the district comt is as

9
I0

follows : fo r purposes of ORS 86. 735( I). the "beneficiary" is the lender to whom the

II

obligation that the trust deed secm es is owed or the lender's s uccessor i11 i11terest. Thus,

12

an entit y like tvJERS. which is not a lender, may no t be a tru st deed's "benefic iary, " unless

13

it is a lender ' s successor in i11terest.
The 20 12 legis lature s ig nificantly a111ernled the OTDA. The quo ted
wording from OR S 86. 735(4) was one or the amendments. Or L:nvs 20 12, ch 112, § G.
6

We di sc uss defendants' other arguments pertaining to the lmv of agency,
includi11g their argument thal l'vlERS, as the lender's "uomiuee." may hold "legal title" to
the lender's rights under the trust deed, in om answer to the fourth certified question .
Defendant s also argue that the legislative history of the OTDA supports
the ir interpreta tion of the sta tute and have included portions of the legis lative history in
s11pport of that ciC1i111 . Defendants' theory is that, insofar as the legislati ve history
discloses that the legislature's general purpose in enacting the OTDA w<ls to provide a
simpler and more economica l method of foreclosure to attract more lenders to Oregon, an
interpretation that permits the parties to contractually appoint a beneficiary \vou ld
advance that purpose. We do not find the proffered hi story. or defendant s' theory of it s
relevance, to be helpful, and do not di scuss it Ji.1rtlter.

22

UL SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION
2

3
4
5
6
7

":Wfay 1vIERS be designated as beneficiary under the Oregon Trust
Deed Act where the trust deed provides that MERS 'holds only legal title to
the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument_ but, if
necessary to comply vvith law or custom, ~JER.S (as nominee fl1r Lender
and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of
those interests'?"
This question goes to defendants' theory that, under the OTDA, l'v1ERS is

8
9

elif',ible to serve as "beneficiary" of a trust deed m a role as the oblif',ee's agent or

10

nominee. The theory behind the question is: If ORS 86. 705(2). in fact, defines

11

"beneficiary" in terms of a beneficiary's function in the trust arrangen1ent, which function

12

is definecL in tum, by the beneficiary's rights that are secured by the trust deed, then an

13

agent or nominee \Vho has been delegated sufficient rights should qualify as n beneficiary

14

under the statute. Defendants contend that the obligees that MERS serves. as agent or

15

nominee. have delef',ated to fv!ERS sufficient rights for that purpose. Because the more

16

precise question is whether MERS is eligible to serve as a beneficiary under the OTDA.

17

not whether it may be "designated" as such, 'Ne amend the certified question and nns\ver

18

it accordinf',ly.

19

Defendants arg11e. first. that by defining MERS as the beneficiary "acting

20

solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." the trust deeds in

21

these cnses clearly convey an intention that l'v1ERS act as the lender's or its successors'
agent. Defendnnts nlso contend thnt Iv!ERS's agreement with its members explicitly
Provides tlrnt

24

~IERS

\Vill serve as the 1nembers' common agent -- allowing MERS to act
~-

~

as agent or nominee for the initial lemler and any successors in iJ1terest who are members

of J'vfERS. s Finally. defendants poiut to \Vording in the trust deeds that purports to
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

authorize .ivIERS to exercise all of the lender's rights under the trust deeds:
"Borrower understands and agrees that l'vIERS holds only legal title to the
interests granted by BoITower in this Security Instrument bur, (/necessmy
to comp(l' with law or c11stom, AfERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's
successors ond assigns) hos the right: to exercise any or o!l o.l those
interests, including, but not limited to, the right ro foreclose and se!l the
Property, and to take ony action required ofLender including, b111 no/
limited lo, releasing and canceling this Securiry lnstmment."

l0

Defendants argue that if J\fERS, as the obligee's nominee. must have some or all of the

II

obligee's rights to qnalit)' as the trnst deed beneficiary for purposes of ORS 86. 705(3).

12

then the broad delegation of pm.ver to l'vfERS contained in the quoted provisiou would be

13

sufficient to make I'vIERS eligble to serve as the "beneficiary."

14

It is unspoken. but evident, that the necessity to which the above provision

15

refers is the necessity of haviug IvfERS be recognized as the trust deed beneficiary for

16

purposes of any requirement that must be satisfied before the trust deed may be

l7

nonjnclicially foreclosed. That the provision imbues the \Vorel "necessary" with an

18

unnatural meaning, with the result that the provision is circular, does not render the

The rv1ERS membership agreement is not in the record. but 1v1ERS asserts,
in its brief to this court. that the agreement provides that "J\.JERS shall at all times comply
with the instruction of the beneficial owner of mortgage loans." and that it grants J\lERS
authority to "execute important documents, foreclose and take all other actions necessary
to protect the interests of the noteholder." Defendants also note that other courts have
determined, in cases in which the MERS membership agreement wos placed in tlte
record, that the agreement spells out MERS's duties to its members in those terms.
Neither defendants' bare assertions nor the cases cited provide a basis for this court to
determine what the agreements actually provide in the cases before the district court.

24

provision unenforceable. as plaintiffs seem to suggest. We accept the provision in the
2

way it apparently was intended: It is triggered by any apparent deficiency iu 1'vIERS's

3

authority to serve as beneficiary. aucl, according to defendants' theory. results in the

4

delegation to I'vIERS of any of the obligee's rights or interests that IvIERS might be

5

required to have for that purpose.

6

The problem with defendants' theory. however, is that. while asserting

7

l'vlERS's authority to exercise oil of the obligee's rights and interests. the provision fails

8

to speak to the one interest that an entity must have to qualify as a beneficiary under ORS

9

86. 705(2). As discussed above.

Or at

(slip op at 22). the beneficiary under that

I0

definition is the person to \Vhorn the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed.

ll

lJnless the "law or custom" provision transforms IvfERS into such an obligee. it cannot

12

transform I'v1ERS into the "beneficiary" of the trust deed.

13

And it is clear that the "law or custom" provision does not have that legal

14

effect. The provision first states that tvIERS holds "only legal title to the interests granted

15

by Borroiver in this Security Instrument." \Vhen the provision thereafter states that

16

!VIERS has the right "to exercise any or all of those interests," if 11ecessary to comply with

17

law or custom, it refers lo the mterests "granted by the borrower in this security

18

instrument." But the interests that are granted by the grnntor in a trust deed are different

19

from the right to repayment under a related promissory note. As discussed above, ___ Or

20

at

2I

trustee. a legal interest in the snbject real property. \:vhich may be foreclosed upon the

22

obligor ' s default on the 1111derlying obligation: and to the beneficiary. the beneficial

(slip op at 6). the grautor conveys two interests by signing a trnst deed: to the

25

counterpart to tlrnt legal interest. ln each of the four trust deeds that are at issue, the first
2

(legal) interest is conveyed in the following sentence in tlre "Transfer of Rights in the

3

Pro1)ertyu provision: "Bo1To\ver

4

power of sale, the following described property." That the lender obtnins the benefit of

:'i

the legal interest that is granted to the trustee is conveyed in the preceding sentence:

irrevocably~

grants and conveys to

T'rustee~

in trust.. \Vith

6
7
8
9

"This Security Instrmnent sec11res to Lender: (i) the repayrnent of the Loan,
alld all renewals. extensions and rnodirications of the Note. and (ii) the
performance or Borrmver's covenants and agreements under this Security
Instrument and the Note."

10

Tims, the interests and rights that were "granted by the borrower under this security

Il

instrument" were only ( l) a legal interest in the property that the trust deed burdens. in

12

the form of a lien: and (2) an equitable or beneficial interest in that lien.

13

In contrast, in these cases, the interest in the secured obligation that a party

14

must have to qualify as the trust deed's "beneficiary" -- the obligation that the trnst deed

I :'i

secures -- is the right to repayment of the obligation. Although rela1ed to the above-

16

mentioned interests that are granted in the trust deed by the grantor, that right to

I7

repayment is not one of those interests. That is , the obligee's right to repayment is

18

sec11red by the lien on the property that the grantor grants iu the trust deed , but that right

19

exists apart from the trust deed and is not "granted by the borrower in the [trust deed].'' It

20

fr)Ilows that, even if the "law or custom" clause \Vere triggered so that the right to

2l

exercise "any or all" interests granted in the trust deed by the borrower was delegated to

22

!vfERS, .lvIERS still would not have an interest that would qualify it as the trust deed's

26

beneficiary.
2

9

To conclude: A "beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA is the person to

3

whom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed. At the time of origination, that

4

person is the lender. The trust deeds in these cases designate the lender as the

5

beneficiary, when they provide: "This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the

6

repay111ent oft he loan. and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the note: and (ii)

7

the perfonnance of borrower's covenants and agreements under this security instrument

8

and the note." Because the provision that I'vIERS "holds only legal title to the interests

9

granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument. but if necessary to comply with law or

IO

custom, iVlERS ***has the right to exercise any or all of those interests," docs not

11

convey to MERS the beneficial right to repayment of the secured obligation, the inclusion

12

of that provision does not alter the trnst deed's designation of the lender as the

l3

"beneficiary" or make MERS eligible to serve in that capacity.

14
15
16
17
18

IV. THIRD CERTIFIED QUESTION
"Does the transfer of a promissory note from the lender to a
successor result in an automatic assignment of the securing trust deed that
must be recorded prior to the commencement of nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings under ORS 86.735(1)')"

9

Moreover. the "law or custom" provision purports to delegate to I\lERS the
right "to exercise" any of the interests granted in the trust deed by the grant or: it does not
purport to actually convey those interests to I'vJERS. Given that the OTDA defines
"beneficiary" in terms of an interest that the beneficiary hos (the right to payment that the
trust deed secures), and not in terms of the interests that the beneficiary docs or may
exercise, it is doubtful that couvcying to MERS a right "to exercise" the beneficiary's
interest could bring I'v1ERS within the statutory definition.

27

l

As \Ve already have mentioned.

Or at

(slip op at 8-9). Oregon law

2

provides that the transfer of a promissory note that is secured by a mortgage

3

automatically effects. by operation of law, an assignment of the mortgage. Because a

4

trust deed is a species of mortgage and is "subject to all lmvs relating to mortgages

.'.'i

properly," ORS 86. 715, the same principle applies to trust deeds: A trnst deed follmvs

6

the prmnissory note that it secures. The third certified question thus asks whether snch

7

assignments by operation of law are included in the statutory requirement of ORS

8

86.735(1) that "any assignments of the trust deed by the*** beneficiary*** [be]

9

recorded" in the pertinent real property records. If the answer to that question is "yes,"

011

real

l0

then the fact that the promissory notes have been transferred without corresponding

11

recorded assignments of the trust deeds \Vould stand as a bar to nonjudicial foreclosure

12

under ORS 86. 735 in the cases before the federal com!. Defendants argue. limveveL that

13

the term "assignments," as used in ORS 86. 735( l ). refers only to assignments of a trust

14

deed that are memorialized in a writing other than a writing that may serve to transfer the

1 .'.'i

promissory note. Therefore. as defenclauts argue, the statute does not require that

16

assif1.I11Hents that result from the transfer of a promissory note be recorded before a

I7

nonjudicial foreclosure can proceed. The issue is (again) one of statutory construction,

18

this time focusing on the meaning of the phrase "any assignments" in ORS 86.735(1).

19

The text is not conclusive. Although the term "assignment" may carry a

20

connotation of a \Vritten transfer of the trust deed itself. it appears to be broad enough to

21

encompass any manner of transfer of the trust deed. such as by opernt ion oflmv. The

22

first definition of the \Von! "assign" that appears in TVebster's Third /1/ew Int'! Dictionm:v

28

132 (11nabridged eel 2002) reflects the narrow connotation: "to transfer to another in
2

writing.'' However, other definitions that appear in IJ'ebster's. and those that appear in

3

Black~s·

4

interest may be transferred by operation of law has a long and unchallenged history in

5

this state. and the word "assignment" at times has been used by this court in connection

6

with that concept. See, e.g. First Notionol Bk r. Jack Afathis Gen. Cont., 27cl Or 3 l:'i,

7

32 L 546 P2d 754 ( 1976) ("assigmnent of a debt carries \Vi th it the security for the debt"):

8

1Vi//omelte Col. & Credit Sen· .. 157 Or at 81-82 (using term "assignment" to refer to

9

"mortgage follows the note" priuciplc): Barringer. LP Or at 229 (in euacting statute.

L<nv Dictionat)\ do 11ot refer to a \Vriting. In an_y event the notion that a securit)'r

I0

legislature "recognize Iedj the right

11

note"). In short. the choice of the \Vord "assignments" in ORS 86. 735( I) does not negate

12

the possibility that the legislatttre intended to include transfers of trust deeds that occur by

l3

operation of lmv. without a separate writing.

* * * to assign [a

mortgageJ by indorsernent of the

14

The use of the expansive modifier "any" ("any assignments") is similarly

15

inconclusive. Although it might convey a specific legislative intent that any manner of

16

assignments, including those that occur by operation of law. be included in the

17

recordation requirement. it also might simply refer to eve1:r "assignment" within the

18

intended (possibly narrmver) meaning of that term.

19
20

The parties also debate the import of statutes related to ORS 86.735(1) that
have been offered as context for interpreting that statute. Among others. they point to

29

ORS 86.1 I O(J ). which \Vas in effect \Vhen the OTDA was enacted, 10 and which pertains
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
11

to the discharge of record of a mortgage:
"( l) \Vhenever a prmnissory note secured by mortgage on real
property is lron~(erred by indorsement withol{/ oj(Jrmol assignmenr of the
mortgage. and the mortgage is recorded, the mortgage, upon payment of the
promissory note, may be discharged of record by the owner and holder of
the promissory note making and filing with the appropriate recording
officer a certificate*** proving the satisfaction of the mortgage.*** that
the owner and holder is the owner and holder of the note. * * * and that the
note has been fully paid and proving that fact to the satisfaction of the
recordiug officer.''

12

(Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that the emphasized 'vvording shmvs that,

13

although this comt's cases speak of a trnnsfer of a secured note by inclorsernent as

14

assigning an associated mortgage by operation of law, the legislature has dnm·11 a

15

distinction betvveen such "trnnsfcrs" and "assignments" of the mortgage. ffowever. the

16

emphasized wording could support au alternative inference -- that "formal assignment" is

17

only one fon11 of "assignmenL" and that another occurs by operation of lmv when a note

18

is transferred.

11

Because that alternative construction is at least as plausible as

10

We set out the current version of ORS 86.110( I). which differs from the
version that was i11 effect i11 1959 when ORS 86. 735( l) was adopted. The differences are
slight and are not relevant to our analysis here.
11

Defendants co11te11d that it is evident that the word "formal" in ORS
86. 110( l) "was intended to have a meaning consistent with the requirements of ORS
86.060, \vhich describes an 'assigumeut of mortgage' as an instnnnent 'executed and
acknowledged with the same formality as required in deeds and mortgages of real
property'" -- and that, as such, it cannot signal a legislative recognitio11 of "assignment"
by iudorsemc11t of a note as an alternative to "fonnal assignment." !Iowever. because
ORS 86.060 was euacted after ORS 86.110, defendants' argument about the legislative
inte11tio11 behi11d the phrase "formal assignment'' is speculative.

30

dcfeudm1ts' construction. we conclude that ORS 86. l l 0( l) is of little contextual help in

2

our inteqxetive endeavor.

3

What does seem significant is that the recording requirement in ORS

4

86.735 assumes the existence of an assignment in recordable form and that the transfer of

5

a promissory note cannot serve that f11nct ion. Because a promissory note generally

6

contai11s no description of rcnl property and docs not transfer. encumber, or othenvise

7

affect the title to real property. it cannot be recorded in land title records. See ORS

8

93 .600 (real property shall be described for recordation according to United States

9

survey. or by lots. blocks. etc): ORS 93.610 (providing for separate records for recording

I0

deeds and mortgages and "all other real property interests"); ORS 93.630 (requiring index

11

to the record of "deeds. mortgages. and all other real property interests"): ORS 205.130

12

(county clerk shall have custody of records of deeds and mortgages of real property and

13

record of all maps, plats. contracts. etc. "affecting the title to real property). Although it

14

is trne that the parties to the transfer of a promissory nole can ahvays memorialize the

15

transfer in a separate writing that is recordable. plaintiffs' reading of ORS 86.735(1)

16

\Vould turn that prnclicc into a req11ireme11t. at least when nonjudicial foreclosure is

17

co11lemplated. But ORS 86 . 735( I) does not appear to express such a requirement and

18

certain mortgage statutes that existed at the time ORS 86.735(1) was enacted. one of

19

\Vhich bears a remarkable resemblance to ORS 86. 735( I). suggest that the legislature did

20

not intend one.

31

Tliosc mortgage
statutes. ORS 86 060 and •· former ORS 86.070 ( 1959). L'
"'" ..
2

were enacted together in 189 5, in apparent response to pronouncements by this court in

3

Bamberger, 24 Or at 210-13. about the absence of any provision in Oregon law for the

4

recording of assignments of mortgages. The first statnte. ORS 86.060. provides:

5
G
7
8
9

"fv[ortgages rnay be assigned by an instnunent in vvriting. executed
and acknovvledgcd with the same formality as required iu deeds and
mortgages of real property, and recorded in the records of mortgages of the
county v,'11ere the land is situated."
The second statute.j(m11er ORS 86.070 (I 959). provided:

10

"Every assignment of mortgage sha II be recorded at full length. and
a reference shall be made to the book and page containing such assignment
upon the margin of record of the mortgage

11

0

12
13

This court discussed the combined effect of those two statutes. at

14

considerable length. in Barringer. In that case, l\/Ir. and .tv!rs. Barringer loaned money to

I5

Hayden. evidenced by a note aIId secured by a mortgage. the latter of which was

16

rccorclecl. The BmTingers divorced, and rvfrs. Barringer received the note and mortgage

l7

as part of their divorce settlement. Later. Jvfr. Barringer executed an "assignment" of the

18

mortgnge to Loder, but Barringer ref11sed to sign an affidavit verifying his claim that he

19

had lost the note and mo11gage. Regardless. Loder recorded the assignment. convinced

20

I Iayden to pay him Ilic full amount due under the loan, and then recorded a notice

21

canceling the mortgage (which \Vas actually held by l\frs. Barringer). Mrs. Barringer

11

later sued Loder to foreclose

011

the mortgage. Barringer. 47 Or at 224-26. Loder

Former ORS 86.070(1959) \Vas repealed m 1965. Or Laws 1965, ch 252, §
I.

observed that l\ifr. Barringer's name appeared in tile recorcL am! he arguecL based 011 the
2

two statutes quoted above. that he was entitled to rely solely 011 the record. In particular.

3

Loder argued that the statutes required all assignments of mortgages to be made in the

4

manner provided therein. and that a mortgage "[could] not be otherwise assigned or

:'\

transferred than as by these section prescribed." ,17 Or at 228-

(i

This court held. instead, that the first statute's use of the permissive \Vorel

7

"may." with reference to an assignment by an instrument in writing. "recognize[ed] the

8

right

9

* * * to assign by indorsement of the note."

Id at 229. The court then adclecl:

14
I:'\

"\Vhen it comes to the manner of recording the assignment the word 'shall'
is used. \:Vliy use the \Vorel 'may' in one section and 'shall' in the succeeding
one? The relationship indicates an intendment that there should be a
distinction in their application in practice. * * * ,·lssignments in the method
designated then could be made be.fore the sra111re as well as by assignment
(~f the note, and the act simpZv prescribes that this may still be done by that
merhod, bur thm such assignmems shall be recorded in the manner pointed

16

O//f.

10

I1
12
13

11

I7

Id at 229-30 (emphasis added). Thus. even though.former ORS 86.070 required

18

recordation of "every assignment of mortgage." and even though Barringer characterized

19

i11dorse111c11t of a note as

20

86 060 -- that is. assigm11e1Its by a \Vritten instrument with the fonualities of a deed or

21

mortgage

1

1

all

"assig11me11t." only tliose assig.1m1Cnts described in ORS

were required to be recorded.
ORS 86.060 andfonner ORS 86.070 -- and Barringer -- \Vere the law in

23

Oregon when the OTDA was enacted in I 959. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature

2il

had that statutory framework in mind when it enacted \Vording in ORS 86. 735(1) that

25

requires "any assignments of the trust deed" to be recorded as a prerequisite to

nonjudicial foreclosure. That inference leads to the co11clusion that. like the requirement
2

informer ORS 86.070 ( 1959) that "every assignment of mortgage shall be recorclecL" the

3

requirement in ORS 86. 735( I) that "any assigmnents" be record eel refers only to

4

assignmeuts like those described in ORS 86.06(L which are "in \\Tiling. executed and

5

acknowledged \Vi th the same formality as required ill deeds and mortgages of real

6

property." Again. the same reasoning. logically applies to assig1u11cnts of trust deeds.

7

which arc "subject to all lmvs relating to n1ortgagcs." ORS 86. 715 .

8

9

The legislature may have intended to impose a difTerent rccorcling regime in
the nonjudicial foreclosure context - to require. in that context alone. that a recordable

10

instrurnent be executed and recorded to doctunent every transfer of a trust deed by

11

indorscrnent of the associated promissory note. so that a bonower faced \Vi th nonjudicial

12

foreclosure could determine whether the person givillg 1Iotice of foreclosure possessed

13

the beneficial interest in the trust deed at issue and had the right to foreclose. However.

14

the legislature did not clearly express that intent. \Vhen the legislature enacted the

15

OTDA and required that "any assignments of the trust deed" be recorded. tile nearly

16

idc11tical statute stating that jejvery assign111e11t of mortgage shall be recorded" required

17

rccordation only of formal. written assigrnnc1Its. Barringer, ,,7 Or at 230;./onner ORS

18

86.070 (1959). There is 11othi1Ig to indicate that. whell it enacted ORS 86.735(1). the

19

legislature did not similarly intend for "assignments" of a trust deed to refer only to

20

formal. written assignments oft he trust cleed, not transfers by indorsement oft he

21

underlying debt instrwnent. By describing an "assignment of mortgage'' as a written

22

instrument executed "with the salllc formality as required in deeds," ORS 86.060, and

34

then. in the immediately following section. requiring rccordation of "[eJvcry assignment
2

* **at full leugth."j(mner ORS 86.070 (1950). it is apparent that the only "assignment"

3

the 1959 legislature had in mind in enacting ORS 86. 735( 1) \Vas an assignrnent by a

4

\Vritten instrument It follows that. for purposes of ORS 86. 735(1 ). ''ilssignments of the

5

trust deed" meilns \Vritten Clssigmnents tlrnt are executed and acknowledged with such

6

fonnalities. not a post hoc nwmorialization

7

solely for the purpose of recording. Thus. the auswer to the third certified question is

8

"no." ORS 86.735(1) docs not require recorclation of "assignments" of the trust deed by

9

operation of law that result from the transfer of the secured obligation.

l0

or a transfer or the secured obligation created

In giving that m1swer. we acknowledge a practical concern that appears to

11

loom in the background of these cases -- that construing the phrase "any assignments" in

12

ORS 86.735(1) as applying only to fonnaL written assig11n1cnts ofa trust deed renders the

13

provisiou meaningless. In particular (the concern posits). a recording requirement that is

11!

so easily bypassed can have no conceivable function in the OTDA's statutory scheme:

15

indeed. read in that \vay. the requirement precludes homeowners in frH·eclosure from

16

ascertaining the identity of the trne beneficiary. That concenL however, rests on the

17

mistaken assumption that the right of a dcfoulting homeowner to establish the identity of

18

the true beneficiary depends excl11sively on plaintiffs' preferred reading of the recording

19

requirement in ORS 86.735(1).

20

To the contrary. the OTDA is laced with provisions that indicate that the

21

12-rnntor is entitled to know the identity of the beneficrnry As discussed above, ORS

22

86.753(1). for example, provides that the grantor (and others) may cure a default before a

35

foreclosure sale by making payment aml paying costs and expenses ''to the beneficiary."
2

Under ORS 86. 73 7(2)(b)(B), notice to the grant or of a foreclosure sale must include "a

3

telephone number that will allow the grantor access during regular business hours to

4

person-to-person consultation with an individual aurhori::.ed by the beneficim:r to discuss

5

the grantor's payment and loan term negotiation and modification." Similarly, under

6

ORS 86.745( I), a uotice of sale must include the name of the "beneficiary-" Finally,

7

ORS 86 759(5) provides that statutory requirements tliat the trustee provide default and

8

cure-related infon11atio11 to the grantor and others "do not affect the duty of beneficiaries

9

to provide information to grnntors." In sum, those provisious all assume that the true

I0

beneficiary must be identifiable. Thus, uo part of onr answer to the third certified

11

question should be taken to suggest that. \Vhere the foreclosing party is not the original

12

lender_ the foreclosing party need uot provide definitive docurne11tatio11 of its status as tile

13

lender's successor in i11terest to establish its right to foreclose.

14

For that same reason, the fourth certified question. relating to MERS's

15

authority to act as an agent for a lender or a lender's successor in interest is impo11a11t.

16

Although we have concluded that the leuder or its successors need not record

l7

assig11wc11ts of the trust deeds that occur by operation oflaw, the fact remains that when

18

those persons fail to do so, they are vulnerable to challenges that may force them to

l9

judicially establish their interests and authority to act. lJ With that fou11clatio11 in place.

J.l

Depencliug 011 whet lier MERS is an agent of tlie initial lender and its
successors in iuterest. one commentator has suggested that ivlERS call establish a

36

we turn to the fourth certified question.
2

V. FOUR.TH CERTIFIED QUESTION

3

"Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow :tvfERS to retain and transfer
legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured by
the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of
st icccssors?"

5
6
7

8
9
10
1I
12

13
I :J
15
16
17
18

19

20
21

Plaintiffs assert:
"The OTDA docs not allow MERS to retain or transfer legal title to
a trnst deed after the promissory note is transferred from the original lender
to a successor. This is because :tvIERS has no legal title to the interests
conveyed under a trust deed and because once its principal has no legal
interests under a trust deed, it may not act on behalf of that principal to do
for itself what its principal could not do. Even if it had some claim of legal
title to the trust deed document that would make l'vIERS nothing more than
a document custodian. not a beneficiary with rights to assign.
"In addition, even if the trust deeds could so111ehow be construed to
convey legal title to l'v!ERS, such n conveyance would be expressly
forbidden under the OTDA. As the only interest granted by the Borrower
in the security mstrument is a lien on the land as security for the repayment
on the obligation and that legal title is conveyed to the trustee who lwlds it
in trust for the beneficiary, there is simply no interest for 1v1ERS to hold."
Plaintiffs also assert that l\1ERS's powers as an agent arc derived fi:om and limited to
those of its principal. Thus, plaintiffs argue, J\fERS has no pmver or authority to act as an

2if

25

agent of a priucipal thnt has divested itself or its interest i11 a trnst deed.
Defendauts reply. first. that "legal aud equitable rights to property call be
satisfactory chain of title "by recording a memorandum of the series of assignments from
itself as an agent
of the original
lender to itself as an agent
of each successive
'·
...
....
notcholdcr." Dunne, ,19 Willamette L Rev at 100-101. As explained in our answer to the
fourth certified question below. these cases do not furnish an opportunity to decide
whether such a course of action would effectively establish tile ultimate beneficiary's
identity and right to proceed \Vith nonjudicial foreclosure.
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separntecl ;u1d held by different parties" It follows , they assert. that the OTDA allows

2

.tvlERS to hold legal ti tie to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured

3

by the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of successors.

ti

Alternatively, defendants argue that J'vfERS has authority as an ageut of the original

5

lender and its successors to execute any assignments required or convenient to fac ilitate

6

the noujudicial foreclosure process.

7

Because of the \Vay in which the parties liave preseuted their arguments

8

with respect to the fourth certified question . it is useful to refrarne it in two p;irts. The

9

first part of the question is:

l0
11
12
13

l ei

15
16
17
I8

"Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow I'vfERS to hold and transfer
leg.a l title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured by
the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of
successors?"
The sccoucl part of the q11estion is :
"If the ans\,ver to the first part of the question is 'no! does l\1ERS
nevertheless have authority as an agent for the orig inal lender and its
successors in interest to act on their behalves with respect to the nonjudicial
foreclosure process?"

l <)

For the reasons now explained. the answer to the first part of the question is

20

"110." As discusse(L a beueric iary's interes t 1111der a trnst deed is analogous to a

2l

mortgagee's iut ercst under a mortgage. ORS 86 . 715 . Further, a mortgage couveys no

22

legal or equitable int erest in fee or for li fe to the 11101tgagee, but merely creates a lie11 that
constitutes security for the underl ying obli gation and gra nts the mortgagee, upou the

24

mortgagor's default the ri ght to have the property sold to satisfy the obligation. See ORS

25

86 .0 I O: Stout

1•.

Von Zonte, I 09 Or 430 . .IJS -3 6, 2 19 P 80<1, 220 P 4 14 (I 923): S chlee/:
38

107 Or at 7•1-79: Ukase Inv. Co. v. Smith. 92 Or 337. 340, 181P7 (1919). Although no
2

Oregon case has considered which parties hold legal and equitable interests in the lien

3

embodied in a trust deed in the context of the OTDA. a trustee typically holds legal title

4

to the subject of the trust and the beneficiary holds equitable title. "When a trnst is

5

created. the legal title is vested in the trustee

6

legal. and tlic other equitable: it also implies that the legal title is held by one person. the

7

trustee. w!Jilc another person, the cestui que trust [the beneficimyJ. has the beneficial

8

interest."' Jlorse er al. v. Pmt!son et al. 182 Or 111, 11 7. 186 P2d 394 (I 9-17) (quoting

9

Allen v. Hendrick. 104 Or 202. 223, 206 P 733 (1922)) (emphasis added). ORS

* * *.

'A trust irnphes

* *that

f\VO

estates. -- one

I0

86.705(7) provides that a trust deed is "a deed*

II

property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation the grantor or

12

other person named in the deed owes to a beneficiary." Under the OTDA. therefore. it is

13

logical to conclude that the trustee holds legal title to the lien conveyed by the trust deed

14

and the beneficiary holds equitable title to that lien. It follows that. because :tvfERS is

I5

neither the trustee nor the beneficiary. it holds no interest at all in the lien conveyed by

16

the trust deed.

17

conveys an interest in real

Relying on this court's decision in Klmnoth lrrigotion District v. United

18

States. 348 Or 15, 227 P3d I J:~) (2010). defendants remonstrate that "legal and equitable

I9

rights to property can be separated and held by different parties." In Klamath Irrigation

20

Disrric!, several irrigation districts and agricultural landowners brought consolidated suits

2I

against the United States. claiming that temporary reductions of irrigation water by a

22

federal agency had breached contracts for the supply of irrigation water fl-om the Klarnath
39

River Basin reclamation project. had breached an interstate compact. and had violated the
2

Fifth Amendment by the uncompensated taking of property. In answering certified

3

questions from a federal appeals court we held that Oregon law recognized distinct legal

4

and equitable interests in the right to use water from the Klamath River Basin that

5

belonged to the irrigation districts and the landmvners for whose benefit the irrigation

6

districts held water rights. Id at 113-d1L

7

Defendants' reliance

011

Klamath is unavailing for two reasons . First. in

8

Klanwth. this court reiterated the principle thaL in determining whether an equitable

9

property right exists. "a court of equity \.viii look beyond the form of the proceeding and

10

if possible consider the substance of the right." Id at

ll

analysis of the substance of the transaction or the actual roles of the parties articulated in

12

the trust deed compels tlte conclusion that !VIERS owns neither legal nor equitable title to

13

the lien of the trust deed. Second. although defendants assert that "Oregon lavv explicitly

14

recognizes that each of the foregoing property interests is capable of further division

15

bet\veen holders of legal and equitable title," neither Klamath nor any other authority that

I6

defeudants have identified so holds. Certamly. au equitable interest may be fractionally

I7

divided among a uumber of owners (as this court recognized to be the case among the

18

members of a water district in Klama1h), but that is not the circumstance with I'vfERS.

I9

Rather. defendants' point seems to be that. even though I\JERS does not

1lif.

As discussed above. any

20

have the right to receive repayment of the notes in these cases, it can nevertheless hold

2I

legal title to the trust deeds, including the legal right to foreclose them. That proposition

22

is not correct for

t\VO

reasons. First as discussed in detail in our ans\ver to the first and

40

second certified questions, the beneficiary of a trnst deed under the OTDA is the lender
2

or the lender's successor in interest as respects the right to repayment. And it is the same

3

beneficiary that has the other statutory rights and obligations that the OTDA confers and

4

imposes, including the power to control the foreclosure decision and process through the
right to appoint a successor trustee. Second. as explained in om ans\ver to the first

6

certified question, the policy choice that the OTDA reflects (that the "beneficiary" must

7

be the person entitled to repayment of the secured obligation) is rooted in the crnmnon-

8

lmv principle that a foreclosing party must have the pmver to enforce the underlying note.

9

See Holton. 99 Or at 429. Accordingly. we conclude that the OTDA does not allmv

IO

l\ilERS to hold or transfer legal title lo a trust deed separately from the right to receive

11

repayment of the obligation that it secures. Because ivfERS does not have the right to

12

receive repayment of the notes in these cases. the OTDA does not allow TvfERS to hold

13

and transfer legal title to the trust deeds that secure them.
That conclusion brings us to defendants' and ivIERS's alternative argument
L'

'--

15

that iv1ERS has authority as an agent of the original beneficiary and any successor

16

beneficiaries of the subjecl trnst deeds to take any steps that arc required or convenient to

17

carry out the nonjudicial foreclosure process. 1·1ic accuracy of that assertion depends on

18

whether I\fERS qualifies as an agent of those entities for purposes of Oregon law. See

19

Resrorement {lhird) o/Agency § 1.02 (2006) ("Whether a relationship is charnctcrizecl as

20

agency in an agreement bct\.veen parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is

21

not controlling.''). This court has defined agency in the followmg terms:

22

'agent' -- using the we1I-defi11ed legal meaning of tliat term -- two requirements must be

4I

"ITJo be an

met: (1 ) the individ1rnl mus1 be subject lo another's control: and (2) the individwil must
2

'ac t on behalf of the other person." Vo11g h11 v. First .fransit, Inc., 346 Or 128, I 36. 206

3

P3 d 181 (2009).

4

Pia inti US assert that. even ifrv1ERS is an agent of the beneficiaries i11 these

5

cases. ivIERS's interests in the trnst deeds ca nnot extend beyond those of the benefi ciaries

6

for whom it purports to act. because its powers as an agent cannot exceed those 11eld by

7

it s principals. Tims. when the interest or it s principal is conveyecL plai11ti ffs argue,

8

!VlERS's authority to ac t for that principal is sinndt a.i1eously terminated. Accordi ng to

9

plaintiffs. nothing in Oregon law "supports the idea o f frecs tall(ling agency on \Vhich

IO

!VIERS relics." Mo reover. plaintiff's note that at least two other court s recently have

1I

agreed with their nrglllncnts. For example. the Arkausas Supreme Comt has held. under

12

virtually identical statutory language:

13
ld
15
16
17
18

''MERS was al best the agent of the lender. The onl y recorded doc ument
provides notice that [Lender] is the lender and, therefo re. l'vfERS 's µrincipn l.
.tvlERS assert s [Lender] is not its principal. Ye t no other lender recorded its
interest as an assignee of [Lender] . Permitting an agent such as lVIERS
purports to be to step in and act without a recorded lender directing its
action would \vreak havoc on notice in this state."
inc , v. So111!111 ·est H o m es of--lrkrmsos. 2009

I9

1'/ortg oge E'/ecfronic R egisfrotio n S)-stem ,

20

Ark 152. 30 1 SW3d I, 8 (2009). 1·1 The Supreme Court of Washi11gto11 rcceutl y reached a

21

similar conclusion

1-i

Under the Arkansas statute_ "benefi ciary" 111ca ns "the person m1rned or
olhcnvise designated in a deed of trust as the person fo r \Nhosc benefit a deed of trust is
given or his successor i11 int erest" Ark. Code i\n11. § 18-50-10 1(1) (20 10) .

5
6

"l\IERS atlernpts to sidestep this portion or traditional agency law by
pointing to the language in the deeds of trnst that describe l'v1ERS 'as acting
solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns.' * * *
But Iv1ERS offers no authority for the implicit proposition that the lender's
nomination of MERS as a nominee rises to an agency relationship with
successive noteholders. "

7

Bain v. Metropoliton i\lortg. Group, Inc., 175 Wash 2d 83 . 107. 285 P3d 34, <l.'i-cl6

8

(2012)

2
3
4

9

Herc. plaintiffs allege that their orig.inal lenders sold and terrninat ed their

10

respective interests in the trust deeds and 11ndcrlying promissory notes shortl y atier the

11

origination of plaintiJTs' loans. t\forc to the point. they allege that tl1ose original lenders

12

transferred their int erests in their promissory notes and trnst deeds (followed by mnltiple
s11bseq11ent transfers as well) long. before MERS exernted or recorded

a11

assignment of

the trust deeds to the purport ed ultimate successors in interest of the original lenders. 111

or the cases. the plaintiffs assert "that the promissory 11ote was sold a11d the trnst

15

each

16

deed was assigned from the originating lender of each respective loan through a series of

17

subsequent intervening purchasers until it was pmportedly conveyed to the current party

18

on whose behalf each of the nonjudicial foreclosures \Vas being. conduct ed." In

19

partirnlar. pla intiffs assert thnt "their loans were sold f'irst to a separat e e11tity known as a

20

Sponsor, \Vhich subscq11e11tly sold the pro111iss01y note and ass igned the trust deed lo an

21

entity knmvn as a Depositor. which snbseq11e11tly sold the promissory note and assigned

22

the trnst deed to Defcndm1t. Bank of New ·York :Mell on FKA The Bank of New York,
("BN'{t\f") as Trustee for the respective seeuritized trnsts of which BN'{i'vI acts as

24

Tn1stee."

<13

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that. in each case. it is J'v!ERS itselC
2

not iVfERS as "nominee" for the actual beneficiary. that executed a \V:ritten assignment of

3

the trust deed to the reputed ultimate successor of the original lender ancl recorded that

4

assignment in the pertinent real property records. Because :tvfERS does not qualify as the

5

beneficiary, an assignment in such capacity is invalid. See ORS 86.705(2); 86.735(1).

6

But, assuming. as it asserts, that l'vIERS also acts as an agent or nominee for the original

7

beneficiary and successor beneficiaries. a different set or rules applies.

8
9

15

In Oregon. agency is "[t]he relationship which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act

011

behalf and

l0

subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Hampton Tree Fonns, Inc. v.

11

Jewell, 320 Or 599. 617. 892 P2d 683. 694 (1995) (quoting Rudrzv v. Ore. Auto. Credit

12

Corp..1790r688. 702.17cl P2d603,609(1946))(intemalquotationsomitted). The

13

principal-agent relationship is defined by. among other things. the ongoing ability of the

14

principal to maintain control over the agent by giving the agent instructions. See Va11ghn.

15

346 Or at 136 (quoting Restatement 071ird)
L'

(~j'Agenl)'

§ 1.0 I comment f (2006)).

In their a1p,umcnts to this court. defendants at times refer to lVIERS as
lender's "agent." and at other times as lender's "nominee" (the status l'vlERS is accorcled in
the trust deeds). Althongh the distinction is for from clear. there is some basis for
concluding: that the authority of a nominee vis-a-vis its principal can be more limited than
that of an ordinary agent. In that regard. we observe that Black's Low Dictio11my defines
a "nominee." as "2. A person designated to act in place of another. usu. in a very limited
way[ :I 3. A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives ancl
distributes funds for the benefit of others." Block's Low Dictionm:r l 076 (8th ed 2004).
It may be. however. that l'vlERS and its members understood the word as a synonym for
"agent." The record be fore us does not illuminate that issue.

44

Defendants assert that. even where multiple trust deed transfers have
2

occurred, l'vIERS has ongoing authority to act for its past and present principals under the

3

I'vfERS system. IvfERS explains that

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
ll
12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20
2l
22

"[ w]hen l\IERS executes an assignment of the trust deecL it is doing so as
nominee agent of the then-note owner. Plaintiffs and omic11s OTLA.
\Vrongly view IvIERS as acting on behalf of the former principaL the
original lender. Agency principles permit l\JERS to serve as a co1mnon
aµ.ent of the oriµ.i11al lender and all successors and assiµ.ns. and all parties to
the trust deed -- including the borrmver -- acknowledge that l\fERS will do
this. Accordingly. when MERS executes a \Vritten assignment of'all
beneficial interest under that certain Deed of Trust[.]' it is acting on behalf
of the current owner of equitable title to the beneficial interests under the
trust."
Similarly, 0111ic11s Oregon Land Title Association asserts:
"Finally, as to the answer on the fourth certified question, l\H'.RS has
authority to retain and transfer legal title to a trust deed aJier a transfer of
the underlying promissory note as long as the lender's successors and
assigns also are members oflv1ERS. In such circumstances, the lender's
successors and assigns have given l\1ERS the requisite authority to act on
their behalf Thus. as long as l'vfERS remains constant as a nominee
holding legal t itlc to the trust deed for the lender and any successors or
assigns, MERS has anthority to transfer legal title to the trust cleecl.''

23

According to defenclants and IvIERS, courts examining the issne recognize

2'1

that l\tERS's role as nominee or agent carries fonvard to subsequent obliµ.ees -- indeed.

25

del'e11cla11ts assert, that was one of the very prnposes for the creation of f\H:'.RS.

16

16

Those

See In re T11cker, 441 BR 638. 646 (Bankr. WD l\.fo 20 l 0) ("MERS \Vas the
agent for New Centm-y• under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became
agent for each s11bsecp1eut note-holder under the Deed of Trust***."); Kiah v. Aurora
Loon Services, LLC, 2011 WL 841282 at 4 (D Mass 2011) ("dissolution of [lender!
would not and could not prevent [note holder] from obtaining an assignment of the
mortgage from MFRS, both as a matter orlaw and according to the arrangement that

45

propositions notwithstanding. the difficulty is that, on the record before ns. it is unclear
2

whether such a broad common agency relationship exists in these cases among rvIERS

3

and the original lenders and their successors in interest. The trust deeds, by themselves.

4

do not establish the necessC1ry relC1tionship: they insteC1d confuse the issue by first granting

5

rvIERS the seemingly-narrow stains of a "nominee" and then purpotiing to grant l'vIERS

6

authority to "exercise" other "interests" if "necessary." l'vfore importantly, although the

7

trust deeds are signed by the borrowers. the original lenders and their successors. who are

8

the other parties under defe11dm1ts' theory of "co111111011 agency." are not signatories.

9

Accordingly. the answer to the second part of the fourth question depends. in large

l0

measure. on evidence with respect to who ultimately holds the relevant interests in the

11

notes and trust deeds. and v1lhether that person and each of its predecessors in interest

12

conferred authority on MERS to act on their behalves in the necessary respects. And that

13

evidence is not present in the record before us.

14
15
16
17
I8

The answers to the t\VO parts of the fourth cert ifiecl question thus nrny be
stated in the following terms:
(d)(a) "Does the Ore.rwn Trust Deed Act allow l\fERS to hold a11d transfer
legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender. after the note seemed by
the trnst deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of

existed between Iv1ERS and Aurora as a 'successor mid assign'"): illERSCORP, inc. , ..
Romaine. 861 NE2d 81. 83 (N'{ 2006) ("1vfembers contractually agree to appoint l'v1ERS
to act as their conunon agent on all mortgages they register in the !VIERS system."): see
o!so Resfafemenf OhirdJ ofAgency § I .Oil (an agent may act on behalf of both a
disclosed principal. i.e., the original lender, and a later unidentified principal. i e. original
lender's successor and assign).

successors?"

8

Answer: "No." For purposes of the OTDA. the only pertinent interests in
the trust deed are the beneficial interest of the beneficiary and the legal
interest of the trnstee. l'vfERS holds neither of those interests in these cases.
and therefore. it cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed. For
purposes of our answer to the first part of the fomth certified question. it is
immaterial \Vhether the note seemed by the trust deed has previously been
"transferred from the lender to a successor or series of successors."

9

(4)(b) "Does IVIERS nevertheless have authoritv as an agent for the original

2

4
5
6
7

~

~

~

10
II

lender and its successors in interest to act on their behalves \Vith respect to
the 1101~judicial foreclosure process')"

12
13
1c:J
15

Answer: The power to transfer the beneficial interest in a trust deed or to
foreclose it follows the beneficial interest in the trust deed. The beneficiary
or its successor in interest holds those rights . .tvfERS's authority, if an~/. to
perform any act in the foreclosure process therefore must derive from the
original beneficiary and its successors in interest. \Ve are unable to
determine the existence. scope. or extent of any such authority on the
record be fore us.

16
17
18
19

Certified questions answered.

47

KISTLEK J., concurring in part and dissenti11g in part.
The United States District Comt for the District of Oregon has certified

2

four state la\v questions to this court. In ans\vering the first two questions, the majority

4

conclucles that only the lender and its successors can be designated as the beneficiary on a
trust deed. In answering the last two questions. the majority concludes that not every

or the lender's interest in I he trust deed must be recorded and that !'vf ort "-gage
""

6

assignment

7

Electronic Recording Systems. Inc. (MERS) can serve as the agent for both the lender

8

and its successors if the record shows that those entities agreed to that arrangement. I

9

agree with the majority's answers to the last two questions but would m1s\ver the first two

'-- -

10

questions differently. In my view, nothing in state law precl11des the pmiies to a trnst

II

deed from designating !VIERS as the beneficiary as long as l'vlERS is serving as the agent

12

for the lender a11d its successors.

13

1

Bart and Jessica Brandrup executed a trust deecl on their property to secme

14

a debt evidenced by a note that they gave their lender. America's Wholesale Lender. In

IS

their trust deed, the Brnndrups designated rvIERS "acting solely as a nominee for Lender

16

and Lender's snccessors and assigns" as the "beneficiary ll11der this Security I11strument.''

17

The issue that the first two certified questions pose is whether state law required the

18

Brandrnps to designate America's Wholesale Lender as the beneficiary rather than l\IERS

In referring to the lender's successors, I am referring to those successors in
interest that arc entitled to enforce the obligation that the trnst deed secures.

.

acting as the 11on1ince or <H.>.e11t for the lender and it s s uccessors . -~
~ ·

The maj ority find s a complete answer to that issue in the definition of

2

3

"beneficimy" in the Oregon Trust Deed Act. See ORS 86. 70.5(2). That Act authorizes a

4

bono\ver to grant a trnst deed 011 rea l propert y to secure an 1mderlying obliga tion -' and, in

:'i

a definitional section. provides that " '[b ]eneficiary' means a person nmned or otherwi se

6

des ignated in a trust deed as the pers011 for \Vhose bcncllt a trust deed is given. or !he

7

person's successor i11 interest *

8

obligation. frequentl y eviclencecl by a promissory 11ote. and tl1e tender and its success01s

9

are the persons for whose benefit the trnst deed is g iven: that is. th e trnst deed is given to

**"

Id As the majorit y observes. a trnst deed secmes <111

I0

secure the obliga tion that the grcmtor of the trust deed owes the lende r. That 1n11cl1 is

II

u nexcept i ona l.

12

It is one thing. ho\vever, to say that the statutory definition identifies the

13

lender and its successors as the persons who ordinaril y will be the beneficiaries of the

14

trnst deed. It is qllite another to find in that definition a legislative intent to preclude lhe

IS

parties to a trust deed from designating the agent of the lender and its successors as the

16

bene fi ciary. We sho11ld be hesitant to find in that n111-of-thc-mill definition a limitation

As the majorit y notes, a nominee is ;1 limit ed agen t. See __ Or at __ (s lip
op at44 n 13).
Essenti all y. a trust deed is a mort gage with the power of sale. A trnst deed
differs from a mortgage primarily in that it conveys (1 11 interest in re<1l propert y to a
trustee to secure an obligation owed the beneficimy. see ORS 86. 70 5(7), and. in the event
of the grantor's clefau!t_ authorizes the trustee to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on
behalf of the beneficiary, see ORS 86 .7 10.

2

on the parties' customary authorit y to slructurc their transact ions as they see fit_ unless the
2

tex t, cont ext , or history of that definitiou requires it. J11111y vievv, the statut ory definiti on

3

of beneficiary serves a more modest role than the one the majority assigns it. Certainly.

4

nothing in the text of the de finiti on expressly forecloses the 1rnrties fro m designating: the

5

lender's agent as the benefic iary in the trnst deed. Nor does the legislati ve history lend

6

any support for the 111ajorit y's conclusion. Rather. the legislative history shows onl y that_

7

in ;1uthorizi11g lhe use of tntst deeds. the legislature sought lo provide a more cosl-

8

effective means of foreclosing liens on real propert y and. in doing so. to expand the pool

9

of capital ava ilable for small homeO\vners. See rvfim1t es. House Committee on Judiciary.

I0

SB 11 7, April 16, 1959, at I. It is difficult to deri ve fro m that history any legislati ve

11

intent to limit the parties' ability to des ig11atc the lender's agent as the benefici ary.

12

To be sm e, lhe cont exl provides a limita1io11 on lhe persons whom the

13

parties may designate as the benefic iary. As noted, a trust deed, like a mortgage. serves

14

as security for the underlying obligation -- in this case, a promissory note. Ordinarily. the

15

mortgage fo llows the note. See Resto/em en t (lh ird) of Property: 1\fortgoges § 5.4(a)

16

( 199 7) ("A trnnsl'cr or a11 obliga tion secured by a mortgage nlso trans fers the mortgage

17

unless the parties to the tnrnsfe r agree olhcrwise."). f\1oreover, "[a ] mortgage may be

18

enforced only by, or in behalf of a person

19

mortgage secures. " Id § 5.'l(c). Pul di fferently, "in general a mortgage is unenforceable

20

if it is held by one \Vho has no right to enforce the secured obligation.'' Id § 5.4

21

comment c. One exception lo that general rule occms wheu the person who holds the

22

mortgage does so as lhe "trnstce or agent" of the person who has the rig.ht to enforce the

\ ;o.,1ho

3

is entitled to e11force the obligati on the

obligation seemed by the mortgage. Id In that circumstance, the trnstec or agent may
2
3

enforce the mortgage

011

behalf of the lender and its successors.

On the one hand, that context suggests that the authority to name or

4

otherwise designate the beneficiary does not extend to naming a person whose

)

designation would render the trust deed unenforceable and thus defeat its purpose. See

6

id (noting that "in general a mortgage is unenf'orccable if it is held by one \vho has no

7

right to enforce the secured obligation"). On the other hand, that context suggests that the

8

class of persons statutorily authorized to be "named or otherwise designated in [the] trust

9

deed" as the beneficiary is not limitecl to the lender and its successors, as the majority

l0

conclucles. Rather, it extends to persons (agents and trustees) who also may enforce the

I1

mortgage on behalf of the lender and its successors. Accordingly. I would hold that the

12

statutory definition of beneficiary is broad enough to permit the parties to a tmst deed to

13

designate MERS as the beneficiary as long as Iv1ERS is the nominee or agent of the

14

lender ancl its successors in interest.

1)

1

Ultimately, the difference bet\vccn my answer and the majority's answer

16

may be more semantic than substantive. After a!L in a11s\veri11g the fourth question, the

17

majority recognizes thaL in theory, l'vfER.S can serve as the agent for the lender and its

18

successors. The problem, as the majority correctly observes, with applying. that theory in

The terms of the trust deed could be much clearer about the role that l'v1ERS
plays. However, defendant argues that, under the terms of the tmst cleecl_ I'vfERS serves
as the agent for the lender and its successors. and the terms of the trust deed permit that
1mderstanding.

11

this case is that the record docs not disclose whether the lender's successors in interest
2

also have authorized 1v1ERS to act as their agent. As I understand the majorit_y's answers.

3

they effectively lead to the same conclusion that I would reach. Ifowever_ because I

4

would answer the first two certified questions differently from the majority, I dissent in

)

pmt and concur iu part in its arlS\vers.

6

Balmec C.J .. joins in this opinion concmri11g in part and dissentiug in part.
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2

I

BREWER, .T.

2

This is the second of two cases this court decides today that is concerned

3

with the nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA)

4

and the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mo1igage Electronic

5

Recording System, Inc., (MERS), rather than the lender, as a trnst deed's "beneficiaiy."

6

In Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co. , _ Or _, _

7

questions certified to us by a United States District Court about whether and how that

8

practice comports with the OTDA's nonjudicial foreclosure requirements. In the present

9

case, we apply our answers in Brandrup to a dispute that comes to this court through a

l0

11

P3d _

(June 6, 2013), we answered

petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The underlying case is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief,

12

brought by a home loan borrnwer against MERS and other entities that were attempting

13

to utilize the OTDA's "advertisement and sale" procedure, ORS 86.710, to foreclose the

14

trust deed that secured her promise to repay. Plaintiff argued that, although the trust deed

15

identified lVIERS as the beneficimy of the trust deed, neither MERS nor any of the other

16

entities involved in the foreclosure had any legal or beneficial interest in the trust deed

17

that would allow them to proceed under the OTDA. The trial court granted sununary

18

judgment to clefencla11ts, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that a

19

genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether all of the requirements for 1101tjuclicial

20

foreclosure set out in the OTDA had been satisfied. Niday v. GkJAC iVlortgage, LLC, 251

21

Or App 278, 300, 284 P3d 1157 (2012). We also conclude that a genuine issue of

22

rnaterial fact exists, albeit a different one than the one the Comt of Appeals identified.

l
2

I. BACKGROUND
Om analysis in this case relies heavily on our answers in Brandrup to the

3

federal court's certified questions, and the reader would be well-advised to review our

4

opinion in that case before delving into the present opinion. Of particular importance is

5

the general discussion of mortgage loans and trust deeds, recordation requirements, nnd

6

the OTDA that precedes the discussion of the certified questions. Brandrup,_ Or at _

7

(slip op at 4-13). Because that portion of the Brandrup opinion covers most of the

8

necessary grom1cl, we limit the background discussion iu the present case to a brief

9

description of MERS and its fimction in the home mortgage business.

l0

MERS and its parent company, MERSCorp, were created in the 1990's in

11

response to a sharp increase in trading in mortgage loans that resulted from a developing

12

secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. In an effort to make that market 1nore

13

efficient, companies that were involved in making and trnding in mortgage loans,

14

including the Federal National Mo1tgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal

15

Home Loan Mo11gage Corporation (Freddie Mac), combined to create MERS. See,

16

generally, R. K. Arnold, ''Yes, There is Life on MERS," 11 Prob & Prop 33, 34 (1997).

17

MERS operates a national electronic database, the MERS System, which privately tracks

18

trnnsfers of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans among the lenders,

19

investors, and other companies that are its members.

20

The present cnse examines the MERS mrnngement in the specific context

21

of the OTDA. The OTDA allows for nortjudicinl foreclosure of a particular kind of

22

security instrument, a trust deed. A trust deed conveys an interest in real property -- a
2

l

lien -- to a tmstee, who holds that interest, in trnst, to secure an obligation owed by the

2

"grantor" of the trust deed to the trust deed's "beneficiary." ORS 86. 705(2), (4), (7).

3

Under the OTDA, if the grantor defaults on his or her obligation to the beneficiary (by,

4

for example, failing to repay a loan made by the beneficiary), the trustee may foreclose

5

the trust deed by "advertisement and sale" of the trust property, if certain prerequisites ar·e

6

satisfiecL ORS 86.710, ORS 86.735. Among the listed prerequisites is a requirement that

7
8

"the trust deed, any assignments of the trnst deed by the trustee or the
beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trnstee [be] recorded in the
mo1tgage records in the counties in which the property described in the
deed is situated[.]"

9
10

11

ORS 86.735(1).

12

IL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
With that background in mind, we tum to the facts of the present case. In

13
14

2006, plaintiff obtained a loan from Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. to finance the

15

purchase of a home in Clackamas Comity, memorializing her promise to repay the loan,

16

with interest, in an "adjustable rate note." The note expressly stated that the note might

17

be transferred from "Lender" (Greenpoint) to a different "Note Holder." Along with the

18

note, plaintiff executed a "Deed of Trust" that (1) identified MERS as the trust deed's

19

beneficiary, but solely as "no.minee for lender"; and (2) conveyed an interest in the

20

property plaintiff had purchased to a named trustee, to secure the promise of repayment

21

memorialized in the note and other related promises. Specifically, the trust deed

22

provided:

23
24

"The beneficiary of the Secmity Instrument is MERS (solely as norninee
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the successors and

3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

assigns ofMERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of
the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrnwer's covenants and agreements
under this security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, B01rnwer
ilTevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trnst, with power of sale [the
property plaintiff had financed], together with all the improvements now or
hereailer erected on the property * * *. B01Tower understands and agrees
that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Bmrnwer in t11is
Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS
(as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right:
to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not lirnited to, the
right to foreclose and sell the property, and to take any action required of
Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security
Instrument."

15

In a separate definition section, the trust deed identified plaintiff as "B01rnwer,"

16

Greenpoint as "Lender," First American Title Insurance Co. as "Trustee," and MERS as

17

"the beneficiary under this Security Instnunent." The trust deed provided that, although

18

"Borrower" would be notified in VvTiting of any change in the entity collecting payments

19

due under the note, "the note or a partial interest in the note (together with this Security

20

Instrument) c[ ould] be sold one or more times without prior notice to bonower."

21

The trust deed was recorded in the Clackamas County real property records

22

within a fe\:\1 days after its execution. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff received notice that the

23

servicing rights to her loan had been transferred to GMAC Mortgage, LLC (Gl'vIACM).

24

Plaintiff thereafter made her payrnents to GMACNL At some point, plaintiff allegedly

25

ceased to make payments.

26

In April 2009, plaintiff received a "Trustee's Notice of Sale" from

4

1

Executive Trustee Services (ETS), which puq)Orted to be acting as agent for the trustee. 1

2

The notice referred to the trust deed that plaintiff had signed and stated that, as provided

3

in ORS 86.735, "the beneficiary [MERS] and the trustee" had elected to sell the property

4

identified in the tmst deed (i.e., plaintiffs home), at a specified place and time, to satisfy

5

the obligation secured by the trust deed. Plaintiff wrote to ETS, demanding that the

6

scheduled sale be cancelled. In her letter, plaintiff pointed out that the loim had been

7

originated by Green point, that she had never been advised of any assignment of the trust

8

deed to MERS, ETS, or GMACM, that there was no record of any such assignment, and

9

that it thus appeared to her that the trustee's sale had been instituted by a party or parties

10

that had no rights in either the note or the trnst deed and, therefore, had no authority to

11

nonjudicially foreclose. The letter ended by demanding copies of various documents

12

relating to the trust deed, including docmnents establishing the "entire chain of title to the

13

Deed of Trust and note." Plaintiff did not hear back fi:om ETS, but the trustee's sale was

14

rescheduled for a later date.

15

Before the rescheduled sale occtmed, plaintiff filed this action for
relief~

naming MERS, GMACM, and ETS as defendants. In

16

injunctive and declaratory

17

her complaint, plaintiff described the events outlined above, and further alleged that

18
19

"plaintiff has never been provided with any Assignment or other document
demonstrating the transfer of the full and unencumbered interest in both the
ETS purports to be the agent of the cmrent trustee, LSI Title Company of
Oregon, LLC. The parties generally refer to ETS as the trustee and, hereinafter, for the
sake of simplicity, we do so as well.

5

Note and the Deed of Trust from the original lender * * *to any person or
entity * * * and has no knowledge how defendant MERS or defendant ETS
ever acquired any legal rights under the Note and Deed of Trust suf1icient
to institute foreclosure proceedings."

l
2
3
4

5

Plaintiff sought to enjoin the scheduled sale on the grotmd that defendants had failed to

6

demonstrate that they had a legal interest in the tms t deed or the underlying note that

7

would entitle them to foreclose. Plaintiff also sought declarations that (l) defendants did

8

not have the necessary legal or equitable interests in either the note or the deed of trust to

9

institute a foreclosure under the OTDA; (2) there had been no lawful assignment of the

10

deed of trust "from the original lender to any of the clefenda11ts;" and (3) defendant's

11

attempt to foreclose by advertisement and sale was "legally defective and precluded from

12

enforcement."
Defendants filed a motion for summary judg1nent, asserting it was

13
14

"indisputable" that plaintiff had defaulted on her loan and that ETS and GMACM were

15

proper parties to initiate the foreclosure. ·with respect to the latter po.int, defendants

16

asse11ecl that MERS was "the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, as nominee of the original

17

lender's assignee, Aurora Bank"; that ETS was the agent of the "duly appointed

18

successor" to the original trustee; and that G'NlACM received the right to "service" the

19

loan from the original lender and, under its servicing agreement with the new owner of

20

the loan, Aurora Bartle, GMACM was authorized to initiate foreclosure on Aurora

2

2

Amora Bank, tJ1e reputed owner of the note, is not a party to this action.

6

1

Bank's behalr.3 Defendants attached an affidavit by a GMACM employee and certain

2

other inaterials in support of those assertions. Plaintiff responded that defendants'

3

evidence was insufficient because it failed to show that (1) MERS had a beneficial

4

interest in the prope1ty that would allow it to initiate foreclosure or to assign or transfer

S

any interest in the property to other defendants; or (2) Gl\t1ACM or EIS had obtained an

6

interest in the trust deed by means of vaJid assignments or transfers that would allow

7

them to foreclose.

8

9

At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the parties' arguments
shifted away from a general debate about the sufficiency of MERS' and the other

10

defendants' "interests" in the note and trust deed and toward a 111ore specific statutory

11

question -- whether the precondition that "any assignments of the trust deed by the

12

beneficiary*** [be] recorded in the mortgage records of the [relevant] county," ORS

13

86. 735(1), had been satisfied. Defendants argued that, insofar as the beneficiary

14

orig inally named in the trust deed remained the beneficiaiy at the time foreclosure

lS

proceedings were initiated, there were 110 "assignments of the trust deed by the

16

beneficiaiy" to record. Plaintiff argued that l\!JERS was not the "beneficiary" within the

4

3

ORS 86A. l 75 authorizes certain entities to "service or collect" mortgage
loans "with the pennission of the lender, note owner, note holder or other holder of an
interest in a note." For purposes of that statute, "service(ing] or collect[ing]" includes
"exercising contractual, statutory or common law remedies, such as * * *judicial or
nonjudicial foreclosure .'' ORS 86A. l 75(3)( e)(C).
4

ORS 86.735(1) is set out in its entirety above,

7

Or at

(slip op at 3).

1

meaning of ORS 86.735(1) and that there was reason to believe that the true beneficiary,

2

Greenpoint, had assigned the trust deed, because a party who was a stranger to the

3

original transaction was trying to foreclose. According to plaintiff, the assignee's failure

4

to record that or any subsequent assignment raised a factual question as to whether a

5

precondition of nortjuclicial foreclosure had been satisfied.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for smnmary judgment. The

6
7

court concluded that MERS was the trust deed's beneficiary, and it also appeared to

8

conclude that ETS was a lawfully appointed trustee that was authorized to foreclose

9

under ORS 86.735 if the statutory requirements were satisfied. The court iluther

10

concluded that, insofar as there was no evidence of any assignment of the trust deed by

11

ETS or MERS, there was no triable issue of fact with respect to the contention that

12

defendants had failed to satisfy the recording requirement in ORS 86.835(1).

13

Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the summary judgment record contained

14

evidence that Greenpoint, and not MERS, was the trust deed's original "beneficiary," and

15

that Greenpoint had transferred its interest in the trust deed without recording the trnnsfer.

16

Plaintiff argued that, in light of that evidence, questions of fact remained as to (1)

17

whether MERS or the other defendants had a sufficient interest in the trust deed to initiate

18

foreclosure under the OTDA, and (2) whether the recording requirement in ORS

19

86.735(1) had been satisfied. 5

5

The latter point was raised in the Court of Appeals by amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA). The Court of Appeals rejected defendants'

8

1

The Court of Appeals reversed. Niday, 251 Or App at 301. Afte.r

2

exarnining the definition of "beneficiary" in ORS 86. 705(2) in the context of the

3

smTouncling stah1tes and case law, it concluded that, regardless of the trust deed's

4

designation of MERS as "the beneficiary under this Security Instnuneut," Greeupoint, the

5

lender whose right to repayment the tmst deed secured, was, at inception, the trust deed's

6

"beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA. Id at 298-99. After observing that there was

7

evidence in the summary judgrnent record that Greenpoint had transferred its interest in

8

the promissory note, and that, under this court's cases, a mortgage (or trust deed) is

9

transferred by operation of law when the note it secures is transfened, the court

10

considered whether such a transfer of the promiss01y note would constitute an

11

"assignment[] of the trust deed" for purposes of the statuto1y requirement at ORS

12

86.735(1). Id at 299-300.

13

The Court of Appeals rejected defendants' contention that the statutory term

14

"assignments" refers only to formal, written assignments that are capable of recordation

15

in their own right. It held that the evidence that Greenpoint had transfeJTed the note

16

created a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether ORS 86.735(1) had been satisfied.

17

Id Notably, the Court of Appeals did not address plaintiffs other argument for

18

enjoining, and declaring invalid, the contemplated foreclosure -- that MERS and the other

19

defendants had no legal or equitable interest in the trust deed that would permit them to
contention that that argument had not been preserved in the trial court, and gave plaintiffs
the benefit of OTLA's argument. 25 I Or App at 293 11 11, 300 11 l S.

9

l
2
3
4
5

initiate foreclosure under the OTDA.
III. DOES A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT REMAIN AS TO vVHETHER
THE OTDA'S RECORDING REQUIREMENT, ORS 86.735(1}, 'WAS
SATISFIED?
Before t11is court, defendants argue that, contrmy to the Court of Appeals'

6

decision, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a triable issue

7

of fact as to whether a "beneficiary" of the trust deed made an "assignment" of the trust

8

deed within the meaning of the recording requirement in ORS 86.735(1). Defendants

9

begin with the Court of Appeals' rejection ofI\.fERS's status as "beneficiary." They argue

10

that MERS can be, and is, the "beneficiary" of the trust deed at issue, by virtue of its

11

designation as such in the trust deed.
Defendants rely on the OTDA's definition of the term, at ORS 86.705(2):

12
13
14

"As used in ORS 86.705 to 86.795:

15

"*****

16
17
18
19

"(2) 'Beneficiary' means a person named or otherwise designated in a
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or the
person's successor in interest, and who is not the trustee unless the
beneficimy is qualified to be a trustee under ORS 86.790(1)(d)."

20

Defendants contend that the phrase "named or otherwise designated" shows that the

21

legislature intended that the parties to a trust deed have the ability to contractually

22

identify the "beneficimy" without regard to whom the trust deed actually benefits.

23

Defendants posit that the definition must be read consistently with "long established

24

Oregon statutory and common law principles authorizing agents * *

25

beneficimy and hold legal and record title to interests in real estate." In other words,

26

defendants argue, the "named or otherwise designated" wording shows that the legislature

IO

* to act as

intended to permit the lender (who usually is "the person for whose benefit the trust deed
2

is given") to designate its agent or nominee as the trust deed's beneficiary.
This comt rejected all of those arguments, and others like it, in Brandrup,

3
4

_Or at_ (slip op at 13-22). In Brandrup, we noted that a proposed interpretation of

5

the definition of the word "beneficiary" in ORS 86. 705(2) that is virtually identical to the

6

one that defendants now offer failed to account for a significant portion of the definition's

7

words, which focused on the beneficiary's flmction in the trust deed arrangement as "the

8

person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." We reasoned that, to give all of the

9

words of the definition their intended meaning, it was necessary to conclude that, in

l0

addition to being the person "for \vhose benefit the trust deed is given," the beneficiary

11

must be "named or otherwise designated" as such in the trust deed. Id. at

12

15-16). We observed that, in a typical trust deed transaction where the obligation that is

13

secured by the trust deed is memorialized in a promissory note, the "beneficiary" would

14

be the person who is entitled to repayment of the note obligation, that is, either the lender

15

or the lender's successor in interest. Id at_ (slip op at 16). Finally, we concluded that,

16

although a lawful agent 1night have authority to act on the true beneficiary's behalf with

17

respect to the trust deed, and might even appear on documents in the beneficiary's stead,

18

such an agent "cannot become the 'beneficiary' for purposes of [the] statutory requirement

19

[set out at ORS 86.735(1), which] is defined, in part, by the status of the 'beneficiary."'

20

Id. at

21

22

(slip op at

(slip op at 21).
In the trust deed at issue here, MERS is "named" as the beneficiary ("The

beneficiary of the Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and
11

1

Lender's successors and assigns and the successors and assigns of1VIERS)[.J"). But

2

MERS is not "the person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." Rather, the terms of

3

the trnst deed "designate" the "Lender" (Greenpoint) as that person ("This Security

4

Instmment secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions

5

and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and

6

agreements under this secmity Instrument and the Note."). Thus, for purposes of the

7

requirernent for nonjudicial foreclosure that "any assignments of the trust deed by the * *

8

* beneficiary" be recorded, the "beneficiary" of the trust deed is Greenpoint or its

9

snccessors, and not !vfERS.
Defendants argue, however, that even if "naming" MERS as the beneficiary

10
11

in the trnst deed is not sufficient, by itself, to make it so, the fact remains that the trust

12

deed conveys to MERS the right to exercise "all" of the beneficial owner's interests under

13

the trust deed (as the beneficial owner's agent) if that should become necessary to qualify

14

MERS as the trust deed's beneficiaiy. Defendants refer to the following provision in the

15

trnst deed:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

"Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the
interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessmy
to co1nply with law or custom, AfERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's
successors and assigns) has the right: to e.wrcise any or a11 of those
interests, including, bnt not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the
property, and to take any action required of Lender including, but not
limited to, releasing and cai1celing this Security Instrument."

23

(Emphasis added.) Anticipating an argument that the trust deed beneficiary must have a

24

right to receive repayment of the loan obligation that the trust deed secures, defendants

25

contend that the foregoing provision conveys to MERS, ''if necessary to comply with law
12

or custom," a right to receive payment of the loan obligations on behalf of the lender or
2

noteholder."

3

But the right to "receive" payment on a note "on behalf of" a principal is

4

distinct from the right to repayment on one's own behalf. As discussed above, it is the

5

latter right that defines a trust deed "beneficiary" in the ordinary trust deed transaction.

6

Or at

(slip op at 11) (the beneficiary is the person "entitled to repayment of the note

7

obligation"). Thus, as this court observed in Brandrup, \Vith respect to identical wording

8

in the trust deeds at issue in that case, "[ u]nless the

9

[the person to \Vhom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed], it cannot

* * * provision transforms l\!IERS into

l0

trnnsfonn MERS into the 'beneficiary' of the trust deed." Brandrup, _Or at_ (slip op

11

at25).

12

13

As broad as the "law or custom" provision appears to be, it is not broad
enough to convey that particular right. As this court explained in Brandrup:

14
15
16
17

"The provision first states that MERS holds 'only legal title to the interests
granted by borrower in this Security Instrmnent.' When the provision
thereafter states that MERS has the right 'to exercise any or all of those
interests, if necessary to comply with law or custom, it refers to the
interests 'granted by the borrower in this security instrument."'

18

(slip op at 25) (emphasis in original). But the only interests tlrnt nre granted by

19

Id nt

20

borrower in n trust deed nre a legal interest in the real property that the trust deed burdens

21

and that legal interest's beneficial counterpart. Thus, the "law or custom" provision

22

cannot convey to MERS the right that would qualify it as the trust deed's beneficiary --

23

the right to repayment of the obligation that the trust deed secmes. It follows that,

24

regardless ofMERS' designation as such in the trust deed, and regardless of wording in

13

Cl

the trust deed that purports to grant IvfERS various "interests" belonging to the lender "if
2

necessary to comply with law or custom," MERS cannot be the beneficiary of the trust

3

deed in this case. Rather, insofar as the trnst deed "secures to Lender" the "repayment of

4

the Loan" and other covenants relating to that obligation, the lender (Greenpoint) was the

5

original "beneficiary" of the trnst deed for purposes of the OTDA. The Court of Appeals

6

did not elT in so holding. Niday, 251 Or App at 298-99.

7

Defendants argue that, in any event, the Court of Appeals erred in

8

concluding that an issue of fact existed with respect to whether there had been any

9

"assignment[] of the trnst deed" by Greenpoint that triggered the recording requirement in

10

ORS 86.735(1). In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on (l) evidence that the

11

promiss01y note secured by the trnst deed had been transfened, and (2) the legal premise

12

that a trnst deed is "assigned" by operation of law when the underlying promissory note is

13

transfeITed. Niday, 251 Or at 299. But defendants contend that, when, as a prerequisite

14

to nonjudicial foreclosure, the legislature adopted the requirement in ORS 86.835(1) that

15

"any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficia1y" be recorded, it did

16

not intend that "assigmnents" include transfers of a promissory note that result in an

I7

equitable transfer of the associated trust deed by operation oflaw. To tbe contrary,

18

defendants argue, the legislature intended to require recorclation only of formal , written

19

assignments of the trust deed.

20

Again, this is an issue that was discussed and decided in Brandrup, but this

21

time, Brandrup supports defendants' interpretation of the statutory phrase. In Brandrup,

22

this court concluded that the phrase "any assignments" was not, itself: dispositive. We
14

l

noted that ORS 86.735(1) -- and the very concept ofrecordation -- assumes the existence

2

of an assignment iu recordable form, i.e. , a written document that is separate from the

3

note and that describes the burdened property. We acknowledged that parties to the

4

transfer of a promisso1y note cm1 always memorialize the transaction in a separate writing

5

that is recordable, but we observed that ORS 86.735(1) does not express any requirement

6

that that be done. Brandrup, _ Or at _ (slip op at 31 ).
We noled, further, that ORS 86.735(1) bears a resemblance to a statute that

7
8

was in effect when the OTDA \Vas enacted in 1959 that proviclecl, in part, that "every

9

assignment of mortgage shall be recorcled,"former ORS 86.070 (1959). 6 This court had

10

interpreted that statute in Barringer v. Loder, 47 Or 223, 224-28, 81 P 778 (1905), as

11

recognizing that a mortgage could be transferred by indorsement of the associated

12

promissory note, but as only requiring the recording of those assignments of mortgage

13

that were "in writing, executed and acknowledged with the same fonnaJity as required in

14

deeds and mortgages of real property." \Ve concluded in Brandrup that the legislature

15

likely had former ORS 86.070 (1959) in mind when it adopted siruilar wording in ORS

16

86. 735(1), and that it intended l'o assign a similar, narrow rneaning to the term

17

"assignment" in the latter statute. Brandrup, _ Or at -· (slip op at 33-34). We

18

concluded, in other words, that in providing that a trnstee may nonjudicially foreclose

19

only if "any assignments of the trus t deed by the trustee or beneficiary

6

* * * are

Former ORS 86.070 was repealed .in 1965. Or Laws 1965, ch 252, § 1.

15

1

recorded," ORS 86. 735(1) refers to written assignments of a trust deed in recordable

2

form , and not to assignments of trust deeds that result by operation of law by transfer of

3

the note.

4

According to that understanding, although the Court of Appeals correctly

5

observed that there is evidence in the summary judgment record that the trust deed's

6

be11eficiary, Greenpoint, sold the promissory note associated with the trust deed, that

7

transaction does not qualify as an "assignment(] of the trust deed" for purposes of the

8

recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1). Neither is there evidence in the summary

9

judgment record of any "assignment" of the trust deed in the intended sense, that is, a

10

fornrnl , written assignment of the trnst deed, itself. Thus, on the question of whether

11

defendants violated ORS 86.735(1) by initiating foreclosure when Greenpoint sold the

12

promissory note but did not record an assignment of the trust deed, there is no issue of

13

material fact.

14

IV. DOES A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT REMAIN?

15

That leaves us to consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists

16

that is pertinent to plaintiffs original challenge to the scheduled foreclosure sale -- that

17

none of defendants possessed a qualifying legal interest in the trust deed or note that

18

would allow them to initiate foreclosure under the OTDA. That challenge is based on

19

plaintifi's allegations that she had received a "Trustee's Notice of Sale" that refeITed to

20

ETS as the trnstee of the trust deed and 1v1ERS as its beneficiary, that, in spite of the trust

21

deed's designation of MERS, the original beneficiary was the lender, and that plaintiff

22

had no knowledge or information as to whether or how any of defendants had acquired
16

I

any legal rights in the note and trnst deed that were sufficient to institute foreclosure

2

proceedings.

3

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants submitted (I)

4

copies of the promisso1y note and trust deed; (2) an affidavit by an employee of the loan

S

servicer (G1v'fACM) describing what defendants believed were the relevant transactions;

6

(3) a report fron1 the MERS database showing the same transactions; and (4) a copy of

7

MERS's appointment of ETS as a successor to the original trustee, showing that the

8

appointment had been recorded in the county land records.7 Defendants asserted that that

9

evidence established that

I0
11
12
13
14

"GMACM, as the hokier of the original note and servicer of plaintiff's loan,
properly initiated the foreclosme of the Deed ofTrnst on behalf of MERS,
the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust as the nominee of the original lender's
assignee, Aurora Bank. LSI [(ETS's principal)], the duly appointed
successor trustee, properly executed the non-judicial foreclosure."

15

Plaintiff responded that defendants' evidence relied on the legitimacy of lvlERS's status as

16

the trust deed's beneficiary. Plaintiff insisted that MERS was not the trust deed's

17

beneficimy, but a mere nominee of the beneficiary, and that it therefore lacked authority

18

not only to foreclose, but also to assign interests in the trust deed or underlying note to

In the hearing, defendants apparently produced the original promissory
note. It is unclear from the record what, if anything, the note showed about the person
entitled to enforce the note or, if different, the ow11er of the note. We know that
GMACM claimed to be "holding" the note in its capacity as servicer of the loan, and that
GMACM did not claim to own the note or to act on its own behalf in the foreclosure
proceeding. There is .no evidence in the record as to whether or how the note had been
transferred to GMACM.

17

l

others. Plaintiff also pointed to defendants' failure to produce, in response to her

2

demands, any document showing that MERS or ETS had acquired interests in the note

3

and trnst deed that would entitle them to nonjudicially foreclose.

4

Because the trial court did not include any explanation of its decision in its

5

written order, its reasons for granting summmy judgment for defendants must be

6

discerned from its comments during the summary judgment hearing. Those comments

7

suggest, on the one hand, that the court accepted MERS's designation as beneficiary in

8

the trnst deed as conclusive evidence of that status, and thus concluded that no triable

9

issue of fact existed with respect to :NffiRS's authority to initiate (or, specifically, to direct

I0

the trnstee to initiate) a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. But the trial court also

11

suggested that the question of whether the trustee was acting on behalf of a lawful

12

beneficiary was a 1natter between the trustee and the beneficiary, not one that the

13

bonower could assert to derail a foreclosure under the statute. At any rate, the court

14

appeared to conclude that defendants' evidence established ETS's authority, as a validly

15

appointed successor to the original trustee, to direct or participate in a nonjudicial

16

foreclosure proceeding under ORS 86.73 5. The Comt of Appeals' opinion did not

17

address either of those appareut conclusions or the broader quest ion of whether

18

defendants had interests in the note and trust deed that would authorize them to proceed

19

with foreclosure under the statute. \Ve now turn to those issues.

20

We begin with the trial court's apparent conclusion that the summary

21

judg1nent record conclusively established that MERS was the beneficiary of the trust

22

deed and, thus, was entitled to initiate a foreclosure proceeding. That determination
18

1

appears to rest entirely on the fact that the trust deed, which was recorded in the pertinent

2

real property records, identified MERS as its "beneficiary."

3

However, as discussed above, _ Or at_ (slip op at 11-14), and in

4

Brandrup,_ Or at_ (slip op at 13-27), the fact that l'vIERS was identified in the trust

5

deed as the "beneficiary" does not make it so for pmposes of the OTDA. Rather, the

6

"beneficiary'' is the person to whom the obligation that t11e trust deed secures is owed,

7

Brandrup,_ Or at _ (slip op at 22), in this case, either the lender or its successor. As

8

noted above, _ Or at _ (slip op at 13-14), under that meaning, .lvfERS is not the trust

9

deed's beneficiary. MERS therefore cannot claim any authority, as the trust deed's

10
11

beneficiary, to initiate or direct the nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust deed.
Still, as this court recognized in Brandrup, _ Or at _ (slip op at 41-46),

12

even if MERS lacks authority to act as the trust deed's beneficiary, it may have authority

13

to act on behalf of the beneficimy if it can demonstrate that it has an agency relationship

14

with the beneficimy and that the agency agreement is sufficiently expansive. Although in

15

Brandrup we discussed that possibility in connection with the issue of MERS' authority

16

to assign a trust deed, it would seem to apply equally to the present issue ofMERS's

17

authority to foreclose the trust deed. In either case, MERS' authority to act as the

18

beneficiaiy's agent depends on who succeeded to the lender's rights, whether those

19

persons manifested consent that MERS act on their behalf and subject to their control ,

20

and whether lVIERS has agreed to so act. Brandrup,_ Or at_ (slip op at 44) (citing

21

Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewell , 320 Or 599, 617, 892 P2d 683 , 694 (1995)).

22

Although Brandrup is not a summary judgment case, it nevertheless is
19

instructive with respect to how MERS' status as a trust deed beneficiary's agent, and the
2

nature and scope of its authority as an agent, might be established. In that case, this court

3

rejected the proposition that MERS's designation in a trnst deed as "nominee for Lender

4

and Lender's successors and assigns" established nn agency relationship between MERS

5

and the original lender or any successor to the original lender. We did so primarily

6

because the original lender and its successors were not signatories to the trnst deed. _

7

Or at _ (slip op at 46). We acknowledged, however, that, depending on its terms, the

8

much-discussed agreement between MERS and members might establish MERS's

9

authority to act as a "common agent" for the original lender and any successors who are

10

members ofMERS. Brandmp, _ Or at _ (slip op at 23

11

there is always the possibility of a separate agreement between MERS and a lmder' s

12

successors iu interest, authorizing MERS to act as the successors' agent .in a foreclosure

13

proceeding.

14

11

7, 46). And, Brandrup aside,

But, as far as we can tell, there is nothing in the summary judgment record

15

in this case that idmtifiesthesuccessorsto the original lmder'sinterestsor shows that

16

1\ilERS is authorized, as the agent of the successors to the original Iender's interests, to

17

iuitiate or direct a no1tiudicial foreclosure proceeding under the OTDA. There is some

18

evidence that the cuJTeut owner of the note is Aurora Bank and that Aurora Bank is a

19

member oHvfERS. But there is no evidence as to whether Aurora Bank is a successor to

20

the original lender's interests. Nor is there evidence of an agency agreement between

21

Aurora Bank and MERS, or between MERS and its members as a whole, much less one

22

that authorizes MERS to initiate foreclosures on behalf of Aurora Bank. hu-ther, there is
20

l

some suggestion that GMACM is the "holder" of the note. If the note is negotiable, it is

2

possible that GMACM is a successor to the original lender's interests or that both Aurora

3

Bank and GMACivl share that role; however, neither the record nor the parties' arguments

4

establish those matters beyond genuine dispute. 8
The h·ial court nevertheless appeared to reason 9 that the beneficiary's

5
6

authority in a decision to proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure is inunateriaJ. To the

7

extent that the court so reasoned, we disagree. On the one hand, it is true that the trustee,

8

and only the trustee, is authorized to foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale.

9

ORS 86.710, ORS 86.735. However, the OTDA contemplates that the beneficiary of the

l0

trust deed -- the original lender or its successor -- is entitled to determine whether and

11

how to foreclose a trust deed after default. For example, ORS 86. 710 expressly provides

12

that the beneficiary ca11 reject the nonjndicia I foreclosure procedure in favor of an

The patties have not addressed the identity of the beneficiary if, as we
conclude, it is not MERS. That issue is by no means academic. If a note is negotic1ble,
the "party entitled to enforce the note" (the "PETE") under ORS 73.0301 may not be the
same person as the owner of the note, that is, the party entitled to the economic benefits
of the note. Because a mortgage or trust deed follows the note that it secures, Un ited
Stares Nat. Bank v. Holton, 99 Or 419, 428-29, 195 P 823 (1 92 1), the potential separation
of ownership and PETE status rai ses the que:;ti on of whether a Iender's successor -- that
is, the beneficiary -- must be the owner, the PETE, or both? Most courts that have thus
far addressed the issue have concluded that PETE status, not ownership, confers the right
to foreclose. See, e.g., Edelstein v. NY kfellon, 286 P3cl 249, 257 (Nev 201 2). Because
the parties have not mldressed the issue, we do not discuss it further here.
9

The court opined that the foreclosure of the trust deed at issue could
proceed, without regard to whether .M ERS \.Vas authorized to act as the trust deed's
beneficimy, because "we have a trustee and the trnstee is foreclosing. "
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l

ordinary judicial foreclosure. More importantly, the beneficiary has absolute authority to

2

appoint a successor trustee at c.my time atler a trust deed is executed under ORS

3

86.790(3), an authority that all but guarantees the beneficiary's control over any

4

foreclosure decision.
However, even if the beneficiary's authority were immaterial, summary

5
6

judgment still would be improper in the present case. That is so because, on the present

7

record, MERS' involvement in the appointment of the current trustee casts doubt on the

8

trustee's status. The h·ial court concluded that ETS was the lawfully appointed trustee

9

("of record, we have* * * the chain, if you will, back to the original trustee F irst

10

American Title"). The trial court apparently relied on a docmnent in the summaiy

11

judgment record showing that .tvtERS had appointed ETS as successor to the original

12

trustee, and also showing that the appointrnent had been recorded in the Clackamas

13

Cotmty real property records. But, appointments of a successor trnstee may only be made

14

by the trust deed beneficiary, ORS 86.790(3), and, as discussed, MERS is not, and never

15

has been, the beneficiary of the trnst deed for purposes of the OTDA. In the absence of

16

evidence i11 the record showing the identity of the lender's successors in interest and that

17

1vfERS had authority to act for those successors in interest, 10 an issue of fact remains as to

18

the validity of ET S's appointment as successor trustee, and, in consequence, its authority

10

As discussed above, _ Or at _ (slip op at 20-2 1), there is nothing in the
sun1mary judg rnent record t"liat establishes MERS's authority to act as the agent for
anyone.
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I

to initiate and pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under the OTDA. 11 It follows

2

that the trial court e1Tecl in granting summary judgment to defendants.

3
4

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affinned. The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that comt for further proceedings.

II

This same logic would apply to any contention that GNlACM had authority
to direct nonjudicial foreclosure as the servicer of the loan with the lender's or note
owner's/holder's permission to proceed, ORS 86A. l 75(l), (3)(e)(C). Even if there were
undisputed evidence iu the record showing that G:rvfACM had the required status or
authority to direct a nonjudicinl foreclosure (and there is not), the uncertain state of the
record with respect to ETS's status as the trustee still would preclude summary judgment.
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1

KISTLER, J., concurring in part and specially concurring.

2

For the reasons stated in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in

3

part in Brandrup v . Recontrnst Company, N.A., _Or __ , __ P3d _

4

date), I concur in part in the majority's reasoning and in its judgment.

5
6

(decided this

Balmer, C.J., joins in this opinion concurring in part and specially
concurring.

l

